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ABSTRACT
Academics, lawmakers, and the general public have long believed that “secret
liens” are problematic.  In real property, these are liens that are not recorded in the
real property filing system.  Secret liens become especially problematic when they
are enforced, despite their secrecy, against subsequent purchasers of the property.  If
the purchaser does not satisfy the lien by paying the underlying debt, the lien holder
can foreclose on the property.  One of the main purposes of having real property
recording statutes was to avoid “surprise liens’’ (secret liens afforded priority over
subsequent purchasers) and ensure that real estate purchasers and investors are fully
informed.  Yet, surprise liens continue to exist and are, in fact, increasingly accepted
by lawmakers.
This Article examines two prototypical surprise liens—federal estate tax liens
and mechanics’ liens—and proposes that these are indicative of a trend wherein
modern lawmakers are increasingly tolerant of surprise liens.  This Article then
examines potential justifications for this deviation from the longstanding preference
against these types of liens.  First, some argue that property filing systems are eco-
nomically inefficient.  Second, some argue that creditors and purchasers do not actu-
ally check property filing systems.  Finally, the article identifies and addresses the
possibility that law makers justify surprise liens based upon the identity of the lienor.
After examining these arguments, this Article concludes that the first two justifi-
cations are convincingly countered by existing economic theory and circumstances
and that creditors and buyers do, in fact, rely on real property records.  This leaves
lienor identity as the true driver behind the rising acceptance of surprise liens.  This
justification, identified herein, is ultimately based upon the perceived socio-economic
benefits arising from granting these favored classes the right to surprise liens.  A
careful examination of the full economic consequences of surprise liens, however,
demonstrates that this justification is not sufficient, and is ultimately self-defeating.
Granting special rights to certain classes of lienors imposes higher individual
costs than is commonly believed and also creates significant costs that likely counter
any socio-economic benefits actually created.  Additionally, surprise liens (even if
economically justified) defeat basic conceptions of fairness inherent in the American
system of jurisprudence and arising out of basic concepts of due process and social
ethics.  This Article therefore concludes that these liens should be removed through a
strengthening of recording concepts at both a state and federal level.
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Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, 2001; B.S., Brigham Young
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139
140 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:139
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
II. THE HISTORY OF SURPRISE LIENS ON REAL PROPERTY . . . . . . . . . 143
A. The Common Law Approach to Surprise Liens . . . . . . . . . . . 144
B. The Statutory Approach to Surprise Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
III. MODERN EXCEPTIONS: THE RISING RISK OF SURPRISE LIENS . . . 148
A. Two Examples of Surprise Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
1. The Estate Tax Lien . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
2. Mechanics’ Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
B. A Troubling Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SURPRISE LIENS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
A. Efficiency of Notice Filing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
B. Disuse of Notice Filing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
C. Lienor Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
V. A REFUTATION OF SURPRISE LIENS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
A. Inefficiency & Disuse Refuted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
B. Lienor Identity Refuted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
1. Economic Arguments Against Surprise Liens . . . . . . . . . 174
a. The High Cost of Hidden Property Rights . . . . . . . . 174
b. A Questionable Allocation of Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
2. The Equitable and Ethical Argument Against Surprise
Liens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
VI. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you want to buy a house.  You find the perfect place, exactly
where you want to live, exactly the style you want.  Like almost everybody,
you do not have enough money to buy the house outright, so you need a mort-
gage.  Getting a mortgage makes you nervous—you are taking on a principal
obligation that is more money than you will make in the next five to ten years
combined.  But, everyone assures you, this is a safe financial decision—so long
as you do not buy for speculation at the peak of a bubble, your newly purchased
asset will adequately secure your obligation and ensure that you are not left
responsible for an enormous debt if you suddenly lose your job or get sick.
You are still nervous, though, about such a complicated and significant transac-
tion, so you take the relatively extraordinary step of talking to a real estate
lawyer.  He says the same thing as your friends: your loan will be secured by
your new house, and no bank will make a home loan to you unless you buy title
insurance, which literally ensures that you will have clear title and that the bank
will have a first-place protected interest in your new home.
That does it.  Feeling confident, you take out the loan and buy the house.
You move in and start to settle down.  Then you get a letter from the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS).  Your house is subject to an estate tax lien and will be
seized unless you pay the full amount of estate tax that is currently owed by the
estate of the fellow who sold the house to the woman from whom you bought
it.  Frantically, you call your lawyer.  This cannot be right, can it?  The IRS
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cannot have a superior lien based on the taxes owed by the estate of somebody
you never met and who owned the home more than five years ago, can it?  The
lawyer reviews the IRS notice and does some research.  Red-faced, he tells you
the IRS can, indeed, seize your new home, even though you bought title insur-
ance and the title insurer examined the public records.  He had never heard of
the estate tax lien until now, but it gives the IRS an interest that does not have
to be filed anywhere and that still takes precedence over your rights.1  You
have been victimized by a “surprise lien.”2
Most people, and most attorneys, believe that bona fide purchasers of real
property are protected against unknown third parties later claiming superior
title or rights.3  This belief is based upon a mostly accurate understanding of
real property recording acts and title insurance.4  Every state in the country has
adopted its own real property recording act,5 which creates an incentive for
creditors and claimants to record publicly any claims they might have to real
property.6  Title insurers use these public records to review such claims and
1 See infra Part III.A.1.
2 The individual consequences of this may be muted due to title insurance, though this is not
necessarily the case. See infra Part IV and note 73 and accompanying text.  Moreover, even
if title insurance protects the individual at issue, it does not justify the existence of surprise
liens on a social scale. See infra Part V.B.
3 See, e.g., MidCountry Bank v. Krueger, 762 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009).
4 See, e.g., id. Title insurance insures against the loss that an insured party suffers due to
the condition of title being less than it was insured to be.  See John C. Murray, Title and
Survey Issues in Commercial Real Estate Transactions, in UNDERSTANDING THE SOPHISTI-
CATED REAL ESTATE PRACTICE 55, 57-58 (Practising Law Institute ed., 2003).
5 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 35-4-90 (1991); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.15.010 (2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-411.01 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-40-102, 14-15-404 (West
2004 & Supp. 2010); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1214 (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-35-
109 (West Supp. 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-10 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25,
§ 153 (West 2006); D.C. CODE § 42-406 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 695.01 (West 1994);
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-1 (West 2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 502-83 (West 2008); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 55-812 (West 2006); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/30 (West 1993); IND. CODE
ANN. § 32-21-3-3 (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 558.41 (Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-
2222 to -2223 (1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382.270 (West Supp. 2010); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2721 (Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 201 (1999); MD. CODE ANN.,
REAL PROP. § 3-101 (West Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 4 (West 2003);
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 565.29 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 507.34 (West 2002);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-5-5 (West 1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 442.390 (West 2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 70-21-304 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 111.320, .325 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:3-a (2001); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 46:22-1 (West 2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-9-3 (West 2003); N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 291 (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-18 (West Supp. 2010); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-19-41 (West 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.23, .251 (West
1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 16 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 93.640 (West
2010); 21 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 351, 622 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-1-1
(West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-7-10 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-28-17 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-5-106 (West 2002); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (West 2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-3-102 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 342 (West 2007); VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-96 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 65.08.070 (West 2005); W.VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 39-1-2b, 40-1-8 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 706.08 (West 2001 & Supp.
2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-120 (West 2007).
6 See, e.g., Dale A. Whitman, Teaching Property—A Conceptual Approach, 72 MO. L. REV.
1353, 1359 (2007).
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guarantee title to a potential buyer or lender.7  At least, that is how the system
is supposed to function.
Increasingly, however, judicial and legislative authorities are creating
exceptions to this system and permitting lienors to assert secret claims that are
afforded priority over subsequent bona fide purchasers for value.8  The term
“secret lien” refers to the situation that arises “whenever one party asserts an
interest in property that is neither recorded nor otherwise readily observable.”9
Secret liens present numerous problems, including, but not limited to, prevent-
ing potential creditors from properly and accurately assessing the nature of a
potential debtor and causing subsequent creditors or buyers to ignorantly rely
upon incomplete information or purchase a property interest that is less than it
appears.10  While all of these problems give rise to the poor reputation of secret
liens,11 this Article focuses primarily on the latter—that is, the potential for a
secret lien to be afforded priority status under the law and surprise a subsequent
titleholder.  Accordingly, this Article refers to such liens—those that are both
secret and ultimately afforded superior rights to those held by bona fide pur-
chasers12—as “surprise liens.”13
7 Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording Act,
24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 245 n.2 (2002) (explaining that title insurance companies use
public records “as a point of ‘daily takeoff’ of the recorded documents, which are then
placed in privately-owned ‘title plants’ where the actual searches are performed”).
8 See infra Part III.
9 Jonathan C. Lipson, Secrets and Liens: The End of Notice in Commercial Finance Law, 21
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 421, 424 (2005).
10 See Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 253, 255-56 (2009).
11 See, e.g., K. N. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 730
(1939).
12 As used herein, the term “bona fide purchaser for value” is not based on a statutory
definition and is instead given a broad meaning, derivative of the common law concept of
one who gains an interest in property for fair value and in good faith believing the seller
possessed full rights to the transferred property interest. See, e.g., 3 LYNDEL V. PROTT &
P.J. O’KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE: MOVEMENT 396-416 (1989) (defining
bona fide purchaser as one who purchased property from seller, honestly believing seller had
right to sell property, and absent any dubious circumstances that would put buyer on notice
to contrary); Seth D. Harris, Innocence and The Sopranos, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 577, 635
(2004) (“A ‘bona fide purchaser for value’ makes a good-faith purchase of real property by
exchanging fair value for the property without actual or constructive notice of any infirmi-
ties, claims, or equities against the title.”).  A creditor taking a security interest in a piece of
property may qualify as a “bona fide purchaser for value,” as it is giving value in exchange
for its security interest.  David Hayton, The Uses of Trusts in the Commercial Context, in
MODERN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TRUST LAW 145, 154 (David Hayton ed.,
1999).
13 The term “secret lien” is sometimes defined consistently with this.  53 C.J.S. Liens § 45
(2010).  However, that is not always the case as ”secret lien” may also refer to a lien that is
merely unknown but that does not enjoy priority as of attachment. See Simkovic, supra note
10, at 256-58.  This Article therefore coins the term “surprise lien” to describe a lien that is
both secret and ultimately afforded rights superior to those of bona fide purchasers.  Of note,
a surprise lien is different than a “priming lien.”  Whereas a surprise lien attaches to property
before the interest over which it is eventually given a perfected priority, a priming lien both
attaches and is perfected after the interest that is “primed.”  This is a subtle distinction, but it
is instructive as to the true nature of surprise liens and the implications it raises regarding
their growing relevance. See infra Part IV.C.
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Although historically addressed by recording acts and other notice sys-
tems, surprise liens on real property are making an unanticipated, and largely
unexamined, comeback.14  This Article diagnoses this situation and examines
two types of liens symbolizing this emerging trend wherein legislative and judi-
cial authorities are increasingly tolerant of surprise liens and the consequences
that follow.  There are various potential reasons for this increased tolerance, but
the true justification lies in an ad hoc approach by lawmakers that view permit-
ting extraordinary and superior rights to certain classes of lienors as maximiz-
ing socio-economic benefit.15  This Article argues that the socio-economic-
benefit justifications are insufficient and ultimately self-defeating and con-
cludes that the most efficient and fair approach is a systemic one that univer-
sally disallows surprise liens as exceptions to real property recording acts.
Part II examines the history of surprise liens and the legal methods created
to address them.  The recording acts upon which we now rely were developed
as a basic attempt to publicize real property interests so that buyers and credi-
tors could make fully informed decisions.  Initially, the law performed this
function by focusing on possessory rights, but it has since adapted by creating a
coherent notice system, the creation and maintenance of which is required by
the states’ recording acts.16  This system is intended to be a “well-integrated
method of establishing the rights to the title of a parcel of real property”17 and
to avoid the danger of subsequent purchasers being surprised by superior liens.
As Part III points out, however, there are important surprise liens—such as the
estate tax lien and mechanics’ liens—that are exceptions to this “well-inte-
grated” system, which inject underappreciated, but significant, amounts of cost
and uncertainty into modern real estate transactions.  These types of surprise
liens have not been adequately addressed in academic literature, and Part IV
attempts to remedy this dearth of research by examining three potential justifi-
cations for such liens.  Part V argues that two of the justifications for secret
liens are refutable by contrary academic theory and current events, and that, as
such, the true reason behind lawmakers’ increasing willingness to countenance
these liens is a positive and normative decision that permitting certain classes
of lienors to accede to an extraordinary lien will create socio-economic benefits
sufficient to outweigh the damage done to the individual rights of the affected
bona fide purchaser.  This justification is not convincing, however, and this
Article concludes that surprise liens should be effectively removed through a
strengthening of recording concepts at both a state and federal level.
II. THE HISTORY OF SURPRISE LIENS ON REAL PROPERTY
The law has long been concerned with how to ensure that interested par-
ties have, or can reasonably attain, information regarding possessory and own-
ership rights.  Indeed, this seemingly innocuous issue is at the very heart of
what property law “does”—proscribes and defines the rights of ownership in
14 See infra Part III.B.
15 See infra Part IV.
16 See Lipson, supra note 9, at 435-55.
17 Ray E. Sweat, Race, Race-Notice and Notice Statutes: The American Recording System,
PROB. & PROP., May-June 1989, at 27, 27.
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property.18  Surprise liens are invidious to this goal because they act outside
accepted norms and systems and convey unknown interests to unknown parties.
The law’s attempt to address this problem has evolved over time.  Under
English common law, ritualized ceremonies, physical possession, and special-
ized documents symbolized and embodied transfers and so created extant acts
or items to which third parties could hypothetically refer in attempting to fully
understand ownership.19  These systems, however, placed much onus on third
parties, did not adequately convey information, and thus obstructed modernized
commerce.20  The American response in the real property context was the
recording act, a highly effective attempt to publicize and make uniform the type
and source of information necessary to ensure adequate information.21
A. The Common Law Approach to Surprise Liens
Under common law, title to real property was transferred by “enfeoff-
ment,” a complete surrender and transfer of all land ownership rights from the
transferor to the transferee.22  This was accomplished through the livery of sei-
sin, a ceremony involving the physical transfer by the transferor to the trans-
feree, in the presence of witnesses, of a piece of the ground (often, in the literal
sense of a hand-to-hand passing of an amount of soil), a twig, key, or other
symbol.23  Once this occurred, the transferor had no further interest and could
no longer transfer or encumber title, even though there was no writing to
memorialize the transfer.24  This method for transfer and acknowledgment of
rights is the genesis of “first in time, first in right,” a concept still prevalent,
though now formalized and publicized.25
Written documents later came into use as a necessary method of memori-
alizing conveyances, with formalization coming in 1535 via the Statute of
Uses.26  This law, devised by Henry VIII as a revenue-raising measure, aimed
to simplify the nature of land ownership and effectively did away with the
requirement of enfeoffment.27  This statute was joined a year later by the Stat-
ute of Enrolments, which aimed to simplify property transfers even more and
effectively required most transfers of property to be registered with a public
official, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood and prevalence of surprise
18 See Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 577
(1988) (indicating that property law works when its “rules . . . signal to all of us, in a clear
and distinct language, precisely what our obligations are and how we may take care of our
interests”).
19 See Sweat, supra note 17, at 27.
20 See Arthur R. Gaudio, Electronic Real Estate Records: A Model for Action, 24 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 271, 272-74 (2002).
21 See id.; Sweat, supra note, 17, at 27-28.
22 Sweat, supra note 17, at 27.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See infra Part II.B.
26 Sweat, supra note 17, at 27.
27 Id. See also George Lee Flint, Jr. & Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured Transactions History:
The First Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Anglo-American World, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1403, 1433-44 (2004).
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liens.28  The Statute of Enrolments, however, proved unpopular and largely
ineffective because it was easily avoided by simply transferring a leasehold
estate (instead of an estate of inheritance or freehold) and then immediately
releasing the transferor’s reversionary interest to the lessee-transferee.29
These haphazard and easily avoided writing requirements were largely
obviated in 1677 by the Statute of Frauds.  After its enactment, written docu-
ments were necessary to create or transfer most real property interests in most
situations.30  Public ceremonies and public knowledge were no longer required,
and the law took a significant step toward uniformity in the method of transfer.
However, this uniformity, while necessary to ultimately defeating the
scourge of surprise liens, was not sufficient.  Even after the Statute of Frauds
was passed, there was no system to make others aware of the written passage of
title because all deeds to real property were conveyed with the land to the
transferee.31  There was no uniform system to evidence transfer or to otherwise
signal ownership—if a transferor wished to alienate title, ownership was
demonstrated by producing the written deed or some other instrument of title.32
As such, transferees had no independent way to verify priority and secret liens
were still problematic.33
B. The Statutory Approach to Surprise Lien
Recording acts addressed this problem of transferees not being able to
consistently confirm their priority positions.  The concept of recording written
documents, tentatively begun in England, started to gain widespread acceptance
and usage by colonial times.34  America was founded at a time when the impor-
tance of land was shifting from its historical role as a font of wealth and status
to its modern role as a commodity to be bought and sold according to the
exigencies of commerce.35  This was particularly true in the new world, which
was not bound by the contemporary mores and aristocratic values still prevalent
28 Though it is often claimed that this laudatory effect was the primary intent of the law,
modern academics instead assert that the true purpose of the law was to permit the king to
keep an accurate record of who his freeholders were and from where his revenues should
have been originating.  See Flint & Alfaro, supra note 27, at 1433-34.
29 Sweat, supra note 17, at 27.
30 See Alberto Luis Zuppi, The Parol Evidence Rule: A Comparative Study of the Common
Law, the Civil Law Tradition, and Lex Mercatoria, 35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 233, 236-37
(2007).
31 Sweat, supra note 17, at 27.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., GILBERT’S COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1343 (Samuel M. Hesson ed., 3d ed.
1934) (“The object of recording acts is to prevent the obtaining of credit by reason of the
ostensible ownership of property which in reality is covered by a secret lien by giving notice
to those intending to purchase such property and to creditors who give credit on the faith
thereof.”).
34 Even prior to the Norman Conquest, there was a system of voluntary registration of land
deeds overseen by local monasteries.  John Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 617, 620 (1931).  Recording, though, was not strictly mandatory, and there
was no uniformity. See id. at 619-20.
35 Gaudio, supra note 20, at 272.  This shift was only heightened by the widespread advent
of mortgage liens, a direct outgrowth of the new view of land as a resource to be utilized
commercially. Id. at 272.
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in the old world.36  Accordingly, the ancient problem of surprise liens
presented more of a problem than ever.
Individuals and entities increasingly required an efficient and reliable
method to review prior conveyances.  The fitful writing and notice require-
ments then available did not suffice, and few owners possessed a complete
record of prior conveyances.37  Even those who did could not be trusted to
produce all records of every lien ever touching upon the property.38
It is in this context that colonial legislatures began to establish the first
“American” land recording systems.39  In 1640, the General Court of the Mas-
sachusetts Bay Colony adopted the first modern recording act.  The act stated
that an unrecorded instrument was good as between the parties even though not
recorded, but required it to be recorded within a specific amount of time to be
good against unknowing third parties.40  A full recitation of all relevant facts
was not required, and only the essential elements of the conveyance (such as
the name of the grantor and grantee, a description of the property and estate
granted, and the date of transfer) had to be recorded.41
Though simple in nature, this represented an important change from the
haphazard English system.42  Public, written notice was no longer a matter of
local custom or a technicality easily avoided if desirable.  Under this new sys-
tem, in order to convey a defensible interest in real property, one had to put
others on notice of the conveyance.  Moreover, this new system provided the
basis for the more sophisticated recording statutes of today.43
36 The first known recordation in America occurred in 1627 at Plymouth Colony.  Sweat,
supra note 17, at 27.
37 Gaudio, supra note 20, at 272.
38 Id.
39 See id.  This intensified throughout the Industrial Revolution, which created an “unprece-
dented demand for credit” that eventually spread from real to personal property. See 1
GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 2.1 (5th prtg. 2007).
40 See 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW
ENGLAND, 1628-1641, at  306 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1853).  An explicit goal of such
laws was to address the problem of fraudulent conveyances. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The
Recording of Deeds in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, 28 B.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1948).  In
fact, there is some reason to believe that preventing fraudulent conveyances might have been
the primary goal of these initial acts.  Certain amendments to the Massachusetts statute indi-
cate that recording was required only where a grantor retained possession of the property
following the transfer of an interest. See id. at 3-4.  Such a focus evinces a preoccupation
with surprise liens, albeit in a historical context, wherein nonpossessory lienhold interests
were not prevalent.
41 Sweat, supra note 17, at 27-28.
42 These recording acts, while advancing the interests identified herein by publicly promul-
gating the type of information needed by third parties, were also likely viewed as revenue
generating systems, as they effectively operated as a tax on conveyances. See, e.g., infra
note 110.
43 Initially, a simple paper system whereby the recorder manually copied the transfer docu-
ment into the records of the town or county was reasonably workable and sufficient to impart
the requisite notice.  Of course, as time has gone by, document records have multiplied,
initially due to the passage of time and concomitant accumulation of transfers but increas-
ingly due to the complicated and sophisticated nature of real property commerce and finance.
See Gaudio, supra note 20, at 272-74.  This complexity was initially addressed by the intro-
duction of indices tied first to names and later to parcel numbers. See id.  Recently, this
complexity has been addressed with more efficient copying systems, computer databases,
Fall 2010] ENDING SURPRISE LIENS ON REAL PROPERTY 147
Like much of real property law, the rules regarding recording are local.
Most governing law is based on state statutes and state-court interpretations of
these statutes.44  There are, however, broad rules applicable across all jurisdic-
tions.45  In particular, there are three generic types of recording acts, known as
“notice,” “race-notice,” and “race.”46  Under the notice acts, unrecorded con-
veyances are invalid against subsequent transferees without notice, regardless
of who records first.47  Under the race-notice acts, the subsequent transferees
have priority only if they are without notice of the first transferee and they
record first.48  Finally, under the pure race-type acts, the subsequent transferees
have priority if they record before the initial transferee, even if aware of the
earlier conveyance.49  This type of statute creates a “race to the courthouse.”
Initially, recording acts were primarily of the race type, but most modern
recording acts are of the notice type.50  The effect of these statutes is to protect
bona fide purchasers for value, except in race states, which provide protection
even if the subsequent transferee has knowledge.  The clear practical effect is to
protect subsequent transferees from all manner of secret transfers.51  This sys-
tem, then, functions to alleviate the age-old problem of surprise liens, so long
and Internet capabilities.  Still, the basic goal and function of these systems remain the same:
to publicize information regarding title to real property.
44 Sweat, supra note 17, at 28.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 These statutes generally read as follows: “No conveyance, transfer or mortgage of real
property shall be good and effectual in law or equity against creditors or subsequent purchas-
ers for a valuable consideration and without notice, unless the same be recorded.” Id.
48 These statutes generally read as follows: “Every conveyance of real estate [that] shall not
be recorded shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser in good faith, and for a valua-
ble consideration of the same real estate or any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall be
first duly recorded.” Id.
49 These statutes generally read as follows: “No conveyance of land . . . shall be valid to
pass any property interest as against a purchaser for valuable consideration . . . but from the
time of recording.” Id.
50 Id.  Most recording acts, of either type, exclude short-term leases, but cover a significant
portion of other interests in land. Id.  The different types of statutes may have a different
effect on the subsequent transferees.  For example, assume that Allison transfers Blackacre
to Audrey for valuable consideration on January 1 and then again transfers Blackacre to
Sophie for valuable consideration on February 1.  Neither Audrey nor Sophie records their
interest upon transfer, and Sophie has no notice of Audrey’s interest.  Under a race type
statute, if Audrey records first, she will have priority, even if she knows of the subsequent
transfer to Sophie; likewise, if Sophie records first, she will have priority.  Under a notice
statute, Sophie will have priority, regardless of who records first, because, at the time of the
transfer to her, Sophie had no notice and Audrey had not recorded.  Finally, under a race-
notice statute, Sophie will have priority only if she records first.
51 The effectiveness of recording statutes is further bolstered by bankruptcy protections
afforded to creditors who properly record.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, a trustee for a bank-
rupt debtor has the power to exploit defective filing by avoiding flawed transactions. See 11
U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2006).  If avoided, the relevant property becomes available for distribu-
tion to all unsecured creditors.  This is known as the “strong-arm power” and is borne from a
concern about surprise liens.  By affording a trustee the same rights as a hypothetical creditor
in a hypothetical proceeding, Congress effectively ensured that the bankrupt estate will have
the same rights as any other creditor. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. No. 93-137, at 18 (1973).  This strong-arm power
has only heightened the importance of the recording acts to interest holders whose rights are
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as it is consistently and broadly applied.52  Unfortunately, that is not always the
case.
III. MODERN EXCEPTIONS: THE RISING RISK OF SURPRISE LIENS
Arising from the evolution described above, American recording acts have
largely addressed the historical concern of third parties regarding surprise liens.
Unfortunately, this apparent success has not been static.  Examining two sur-
prise liens—the estate tax lien and mechanics’ liens53—one finds modern cre-
ations representing a troubling trend whereby lawmakers seem increasingly
willing to chip away at the protections traditionally afforded by the recording
acts and relied upon by lawyers and lay people alike.
A. Two Examples of Surprise Liens
1. The Estate Tax Lien
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides that, “[u]nless the
estate tax imposed by [the IRC] is sooner paid in full . . . it shall be a
lien upon the gross estate of the decedent for 10 years from the date of
death.”54  This lien attaches without assessment and has been judged
to be immune to the IRC provisions relating to notice filing.55  As
potentially voidable. See, e.g., James J. White, Revising Article 9 to Reduce Wasteful Litiga-
tion, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 823, 830-41 (1993).
52 Recording acts do not, of course, alleviate all problems associated with conveyances of
real property, and may, in fact, create some problems. See Sweat, supra note 17, at 29-30.
For example, though creating a uniform requirement for notice of some type, the recording
acts do not necessarily specify what notice will be effective and what documents will pro-
vide that notice.  Similarly, the local county recording offices, while providing an excellent
vehicle for notice systems, do not act as a perfect gate-keeper.  As such, there is potential for
various transferees, or ostensible transferees, to record varying types of documents and to
create confusion and ambiguity for potential subsequent transferees. See id.  These issues,
however, are outside the scope of this Article, which merely examines the ability of record-
ing systems, if properly utilized, to address adequately the problem of surprise liens.
53 This is not an exhaustive list, but is instead a considered examination of two such liens,
how they have arisen, what effect they have on those unfortunate enough to run afoul of
them, and why they stand in defiance of modern recording acts and the generally expected
effect of the same.
54 I.R.C. § 6324(a)(1) (2006).
55 Though contrary to generally accepted wisdom, the law is clear: Unless a federal statute
requires a government tax lien to be recorded, the unrecorded lien may be enforced against
subsequent transferees.  See United States v. Curry, 201 F. 371, 374 (D. Md. 1912); Detroit
Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 337 (1943).  The crucial question, therefore, is whether
there is any statutory requirement that special estate tax liens be filed. See Rev. Rul. 69-23,
1969-1 C.B. 302.  Arguably, there is not. See infra Part IV.C.  The IRS has embraced the
lack of a filing requirement and extended its consequences even further by deciding that,
under no circumstances, can any § 6324(a) lien ever be filed. See INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 5.5.7.2 (2005), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/
part5/irm_05-005-007.html#d0e80 (“Notice of the lien cannot be recorded nor is any record-
ing necessary in order for it to become choate.”).  The IRS believes it is under no legal or
ethical obligation to record § 6324 liens and thereby notify bona fide purchasers for value.
There are, however, several narrow exceptions to this lien.  Section 6324(a)(2) creates a
category of transferee liability with respect to recipients of property that is included in a
decedent’s gross estate under §§ 2034-42 (commonly known as “non-probate property” and
Fall 2010] ENDING SURPRISE LIENS ON REAL PROPERTY 149
such, the unrecorded lien may be enforced against subsequent bona fide
purchasers.56
United States v. Vohland illustrates the arbitrary and unfair nature of these
“Special Liens for Estate and Gift Taxes” under IRC § 6324.57  David Schin-
dler Sr. died in April 1970.58  Approximately two years later, the IRS assessed
an estate tax and a supplemental penalty.59  The executor paid the tax but not
the penalty.60  Subsequently, in late 1973, the Vohlands purchased real prop-
erty from the Schindler estate without any notice of the estate tax, the accompa-
nying penalty, or an estate tax lien.61  Approximately five years later, without
ever filing a lien, the IRS filed suit to foreclose under § 6324(a)(1).62  The
district court granted summary judgment to the IRS, and the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.63
Of note, the circuit court explicitly held that the lien “attaches at the time
of decedent’s death without necessity for assessment or demand,”64 the § 6324
lien is effective without filing because there is no statutory filing requirement,
and “[u]nless a federal statute requires a government tax lien to be recorded, the
unrecorded lien may be enforced against subsequent transferees.”65  The Voh-
lands were out of luck—the lien might have been a surprise, but it was no less
effective for that.66
including property received via a trust, insurance policy, or joint tenancy with rights of
survivorship) and divests the lien on such property upon its transfer to a purchaser or holder
of a security interest.  Additionally, § 6324(a)(1) removes the lien from property that is sold
and the proceeds of which are expended on charges of the estate, and § 6324(c)(1) provides
that the lien is not valid against a mechanics’ lien and certain other liens and interests
described in § 6323(b).  Unfortunately for innocent purchasers, this “exception” is exceed-
ingly difficult to satisfy. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 04-429, slip op. at
2-3 (W.D. Wash. May 12, 2005).  Additionally, § 6324(a)(3) provides that property that has
been transferred to a purchaser or holder of a security interest after the estate fiduciary has
received a discharge under § 2204 is no longer subject to the lien (though the consideration
received by the antecedent recipient of the property is).
56 See generally Detroit Bank, 317 U.S. at 329.
57 See generally United States v. Vohland, 675 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1982).
58 Id. at 1073.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 1076.
63 Id. at 1072.
64 Id. at 1074.
65 Id.
66 Evidently, not content to consign the Vohlands to the consequences of the government’s
unrecorded lien, the court dryly noted that the statutory exceptions applicable after a fiduci-
ary receives a § 2204 discharge and to transfers of non-probate property “provides purchas-
ers considerable . . . protection” and that the Fifth Amendment’s due process requirement
was of no use.  According to the court, a prospective purchaser has adequate means of avoid-
ing such a result by establishing that the administrator has been released under § 2204. Id. at
1076.  This proposed solution, of course, presupposes the absence of the very thing com-
plained of—the surprise lien.  By ignoring the likelihood that purchasers do not know that
the IRS operates outside the generally accepted bounds of property law, the court effectively
maintained that the lien is not secret because purchasers should be fully aware that it is not
secret.  Similarly, the court insisted that the government did not act to surprise the purchas-
ers-cum-lienees because the government did not undertake to foreclose on the lien until after
the purchasers had acquired it.  As such, there was no surprise, there was just a failure of
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So, estate tax liens are surprise liens.  But why is this lien permitted to
exist outside the bounds of the commonly accepted notions of priority and
property law?  Section IV examines this question in detail, but the prima facie
explanation is in a quirk of federal law.  Under IRC § 6321, “[i]f any person
liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the
amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all property and
rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person.”67  This
lien arises upon assessment and continues against all of the debtor’s property
until the tax obligation is satisfied or the relevant statute of limitation expires.68
Fortunately, the IRC does not stop there.  Section 6323 places some constraints
on the IRS’s all-encompassing lien rights by providing that, with respect to real
property, “[t]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any
purchaser . . . until notice thereof” is recorded in an office within the appropri-
ate state, county, or other office, as designated by the laws of the state in which
such property is situated.69  However, the federal courts have decided that this
clear mandate simply does not apply to the § 6324 lien.  “[T]he differences
between [the statutory predecessor to §§ 6321-6323, the general tax lien] and
[the statutory predecessor to § 6324, the special estate tax lien], and their legis-
lative history as separate enactments, indicate that each was intended to operate
independently of the other.”70
As such, the § 6324 lien is affirmatively placed outside the reach of all
state recording acts, an outlier of federal tax law, surviving all sales and trans-
fers to bona fide purchasers regardless of the apparent equities involved.71  In
title.  Again, this Orwellian response merely responds to the complaint that § 6324 liens are
unfair and violate due process requirements by insisting that everyone knows about them and
so suffers not at all.
67 I.R.C. § 6321 (2006).
68 See Leighton v. United States, 289 U.S. 506 (1933); Glass City Bank of Jeanette, Pa. v.
United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945); see also I.R.C. § 6322.
69 I.R.C. § 6323(a).
70 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 334 (1943).  The Ninth Circuit recently
approved of this proprietary view of federal statutory law, based upon the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of legislative history, expressly indicating that none of the intervening
changes to federal tax law had altered the reasoning or applicability of the Detroit Bank case.
Vohland, 675 F.2d at 1075. This blatant approval of secrecy is different from other potential
conflicts arising in connection with the federal priority granted to tax liens. See generally
Note, Federal Priorities and Tax Liens, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1259, 1261-63 (1963).  As is
discussed in greater detail therein, government debts and liens are granted special rights and
privileges vis-a-vis other debtors and lienors.  Federal common law has evolved a series of
tests based upon statutory rights afforded to the government and the government’s need to
generate revenue for the “public good.” See id.  These issues are interesting in that they
potentially permit government liens to supersede, or prime, senior liens.  However, they are
not surprise liens in the sense that they attach without filing and defeat properly recorded
interests of, and transfers to, subsequent bona fide purchasers.  Accordingly, they are outside
the scope of this Article.
71 The case of Sessler v. United States shows the lack of remedy or resort available to a
potential lienee when confronted by the IRS.  There, Robert and Natalie Sessler purchased
land from Robert Granicy and his brother.  Unfortunately for the Sesslers, and entirely unbe-
knownst to them, Robert had inherited the land from his father and had failed to pay the
estate tax due upon his father’s death.  None of the statutory exceptions identified above
applied, so the tax lien provided for in § 6323(a)(1) attached at death to all of the property
owned by Robert’s father and survived the bona fide purchase by the unknowing Sesslers.
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other words, any time anyone purchases property anywhere in America, they
should perform a chain of title search to determine whether or not an estate is in
the chain of title at any time in the last ten years.72  Anyone failing to do so
risks being surprised by an estate tax lien.73
2. Mechanics’ Liens
The next surprise lien—the mechanics’ lien—is much more common.74
Common law provided possessory liens to mechanics and laborers who per-
The IRS came calling in the year following the Sesslers’ purchase, giving them six days
notice before the property was to be seized.  The Sesslers paid the outstanding tax amount to
prevent the impending seizure and sale and then brought an action against the IRS for
wrongful levy, arguing, essentially, that the law surely cannot condone and encourage sur-
prise liens of this nature.  The district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit overruled its deci-
sion, taking a more concrete view of the relevant statutory language.  It held that individuals
such as the Sesslers can only challenge “wrongful” liens by claiming and demonstrating that
they are “wrongful” under federal regulations.  This self-serving circularity is distinctly
unfavorable to affected parties, as the IRS has sharply circumscribed the definition of
“wrongful lien” under the relevant regulations.  Accordingly, a § 6324 lien is a strongly
protected surprise lien. See Sessler v. United States, 7 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1993).
72 In fact, all purchasers must be even more careful than this.  They must also view all deeds
in the chain of title.  This is so because it is entirely plausible that an estate came into
possession of the property due to the death of the individual holding the property and that the
representative of the estate did not bother to “re-title” the property before transferring it to a
subsequent purchaser.  As such, every deed in the last ten years must be reviewed to deter-
mine whether ownership flowed through an estate. See Bradley Myers, Caution Signs: Eight
Things Non-estate Planning Lawyers Should Know About Estates, OR. ST. B. BULL., Nov.
1999, at 41, 43.
73 This risk is particularly acute given that a standard title insurance policy may not provide
coverage with respect to liens not revealed in the public records.  The coverage extended by
a title insurance policy is determined by the contract terms of that particular policy, and
many policies contain an exception that clearly removes from coverage liens not “recorded”
in public records.  In contrast, some policies only generically except liens that are not
“reflected” in the public records.  This difference in language may be material, as an estate
tax lien is arguably “reflected” in the public records due to the fact that a review of the
transferring deeds will show an estate on title, which should theoretically put an exceedingly
cautious observer on notice.  Those purchasing insurance can avoid this entirely by purchas-
ing, at an increased price, an extended coverage policy that does not contain an exception
relating to non-public liens.
74 Every state has adopted mechanic’s lien statutes that apply to private construction
projects. See ALA. CODE §§ 35-11-210 to -431 (1999 & Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§§ 34.35.050–.120 (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-981 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 18-44-101 (West 2004); CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-22-101
to -133 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-33 to -40a (2006); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2701–2702 (West 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.001–02 (West
2000); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 44-14-360 to -369 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 507-42 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-501 (West 2006); 770 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 60/1 to /39 (West 2001 & Supp. 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-28-3-1 (West Supp.
2010); IOWA CODE § 572.33 (Supp. 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101 (1994); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 376.010 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4801– :4802 (2007); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 3251–3253 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. §§ 9-101 to -
103 (West 2002 & Supp. 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 254, §§ 1–33 (West 2004);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 570.1101–1107 (West 2007); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 514.01–.16 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-7-131 (West Supp. 2010);
MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 429.010–.360 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-3-521 to -563
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-126 to -131 (LexisNexis 2009); NEV. REV. STAT.
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formed work on personal property.  In the event debtors did not pay for the
work performed, the lien holders could sell the property to collect payment.75
This lien was of little value, however, if laborers gave up possession of the
personalty or performed work on real property. In that case, laborers effectively
lost any interest in the improvement performed and their sole recourse was to
pursue a judgment.76
This changed, however, with the advent of the construction lien, which
originated in the United States in 1791.77  Those supplying materials for the
construction of the White House had concerns about the financial stability of
the new government, so Maryland lawmakers passed a law securing liens for
laborers and suppliers furnishing services and materials with respect to real
property construction.78  Pennsylvania passed a similar law in 1803, and, over
the next sixty years, more than thirty comparable statutes were enacted.79
Most state statutes provide that a lien arises in all aspects of the real prop-
erty, including fixtures, when the varying aspects of work performed on the real
property combine into an indivisible whole.80  This scheme raises two primary
§§ 108.221–.222 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 447:1– :5 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2A:44-2 to :44A-3 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-2 (West 2003); N.Y. LIEN LAW
§§ 2–3 (McKinney 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44A-7 to -24 (West 2000 & Supp.
2010); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-27-01 to -02 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1311.01–.02 (2004 & Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 141 (West
2001); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 87.010–.015 (West 2003); 49 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1101–1301 (West 2001 & Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 34-28-1 to -37 (West
2006 & Supp. 2010); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-10 to -440 (2007 & Supp. 2009); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS §§ 44-9-1 to -53 (2004 & Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-11-101 to -103
(West 2002 & Supp. 2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 53.001–.021 (West 2007); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 38-1-1 to -3 (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 1921–1928
(West 2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1 to -3 (West 2001 & Supp. 2010); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 64.04.011–.021 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-2-1 to -2 (West 2002);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 779.01–.02 (West 2001 & Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-2-101
to -113 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010).
75 See STEVEN ANGLEY ET AL., LANDSCAPE ESTIMATING AND CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION
190 (2002).
76 See id.
77 See Margie Alsbrook, Contracting Away an Honest Day’s Pay: An Examination of Con-
ditional Payment Clauses in Construction Contracts, 58 ARK. L. REV. 353, 359 (2005); see
also Emory Potter & Mark Duedall, Evolving Issues in Secret Liens, 2 DEPAUL BUS. &
COM. L.J. 713, 713 (2004).
78 Alsbrook, supra note 77, at 359-60.
79 Blake Nelson, Construction Liens: A National Review and Template for a Uniform Lien
Act, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 245, 247 (2007).  These original statutes provided for liens
only with respect to the construction of particular structures within specified geographic
boundaries. HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE
UNITED STATES TO 1860, at 155-56 (1938); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERI-
CAN LAW 178 (3d ed. 2005).  The initial intent of these statutes was to encourage construc-
tion activity. See Nelson, supra at 247.  However, other forces also contributed to their
widespread adoption.  In particular, labor movements and organizations systematically
encouraged these laws as a way to support the working class. See FARNAM, supra at 155.
Though not particularly consonant in purpose, these disparate forces effectively combined to
spread the concept throughout America. See id. at 178.
80 Nelson, supra note 79, at 248.  It is a well-established principle that construction liens
provide a lienhold interest in the entire property at issue to secure the value of each laborer’s
and supplier’s contribution thereto.  53 AM. JUR. 2D Mechanics’ Liens § 12 (2010).
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issues: (1) what work falls within the scope of the statute and so gives rise to a
construction lien; and (2) whether the statutory procedures for priority have
been satisfied such that the relevant lien is perfected.81  As to the first issue,
mechanics’ liens generally arise in favor of parties that provide labor, materials,
equipment, and other services82 that contribute to the improvement of real
property,83 and they generally attach to the owner’s interest in the improved
property.84  It is the second issue, however, that invokes the concept of surprise
liens.  These liens are statutory creations, so they exist outside, or alongside,
state recording acts, and do not come within the general ambit of those acts,
thus enjoying whatever particular priority the legislature decided to grant to
them.85  And state legislatures grant these liens unique priority.86
81 Nelson, supra note 79, at 248.  Courts employ strict statutory construction in determining
these issues, and lien claimants must establish that they meet the requirements of the statute.
See id. at 248-49 (citing Wind Dance Farm, Inc. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 792 N.E.2d 79, 82
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003); Mark Twain Kan. City Bank v. Kroh Bros. Dev. Co., 798 P.2d 511,
515 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990); Lentz Plumbing Co. v. Fee, 679 P.2d 736, 744 (Kan. 1984)).
82 See 53 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 80, § 12.  There is considerable variation from state to
state with some jurisdictions broadly providing lien rights to everybody participating in the
improvement of the property and others carefully distinguishing among different classes of
work or different contractual relationships.  Nelson, supra note 79, at 249-52 (discussing the
various types of laborers, the varying rights accorded to them under differing statutes, and
arguing for the adoption of a uniform lien act).
83 Nelson, supra note 79, at 252-53.  Most statutes allow liens with respect to any material
or labor that improves the property; that is, anything that is used to create, alter, or improve a
fixture or the real property itself. See 53 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 80, §§ 4, 12.  Again, the
precise contours of what will qualify as lienable work varies by jurisdiction.  Nelson, supra
note 79, at 249-52 (examining different jurisdictions and different decisions and again argu-
ing for the adoption of a uniform act).
84 Nelson, supra note 79, at 253-56.  Some jurisdictions have extended this lien to the prop-
erty upon which an improved structure is located and also to any nearby land that may be
necessary to the use of the improved property. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.35.055
(West 2007); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3128 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-22-103(1)
(West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 429.010 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 141
(West 2001); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.022 (West 2007).  The nature and location of the
land may also affect the scope of the lien. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 514.03(3) (West 2002);
MO. ANN. STAT. § 429.010; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 53.022.  Similarly, the identity,
authority, and ownership interest of the party authorizing the work will likely limit the right
of the lienor. See, e.g., Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (examining
the right of a lessee to expose a lessor’s interest to a mechanics’ lien and stating that “‘[s]o
long as it can be found that the [contractor] performed the work at the instance of [the
owner] under an express or implied contract . . . the lien is valid.”’ (quoting Dugger v. Cox,
564 P.2d 300, 302 (Utah 1977) (alterations in original)).
85 This particularity is as such when compared to the generic priority allotted real property
ownership interests by state recording acts.  Mechanics’ lien priority is rarely thought of as
outside this schema, however, because its presence is simply an accepted part of the title
landscape and has long enjoyed particular statutory treatment. But see Michael F. Jones &
Rebecca R. Messall, Mechanic’s Lien Title Insurance Coverage for Construction Projects:
Lenders and Insurers Beware, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 291, 291 (1988).
86 Being statutory constructions, these liens must comply with applicable perfection require-
ments before being granted any priority.  Generally, every state requires the following: (1)
notice to the owner of lien rights, and (2) proper filing.  Nelson, supra note 79, at 256.
Again, these requirements vary by state.  Some states do not require any notice, some require
it only of prime contractors, and some require it of every party who would claim a lien. See,
e.g., 770 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 60/21 (West Supp. 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
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In particular, the traditional “first in time, first in right” doctrine is rou-
tinely subverted, albeit in a limited manner, by the “relation-back” doctrine.
Under this concept, a properly filed and perfected mechanics’ lien is deemed to
have priority as of the date on which “visible, on-site construction which could
be said to signal the ‘commencement’ of the building, erection, structure, or
improvement has taken place.”87  Of course, there are significant variations in
this doctrine from state to state, as the statutes themselves differ in important
respects, and as interpretive common law also varies from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.88
§ 3252 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 9-104 (West Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 514.011 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. § 779.02 (West 2001 & Supp. 2010).  Additionally, the
time and manner in which this notice must be filed, and the time in which the consequently
acceptable lien may be filed, differs from statute to statute. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-44-
115 (West Supp. 2010) (requiring notice before commencement of labor or furnishing of
materials); IOWA CODE § 572.33(1) (Supp. 2010) (requiring notice within thirty days from
commencement of labor or furnishing of materials); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3253
(requiring notice within ninety days from the last contribution of labor or materials); N.D.
CENT. CODE ANN. § 35-27-02 (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) (requiring notice fifteen days prior
to filing).  Mostly, the last date upon which work was performed on the property (a concept
that itself varies by jurisdiction) controls the filing deadline, with deadlines therefrom vary-
ing from ninety days to eight months and some statutes discriminating based upon the status
of the claimant. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.068; IND. CODE § 32-28-3-3(3)(a)(2) (West
2002 & Supp. 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 3255(1); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:44A-6
(West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-6 (West 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 35-27-13;
N.Y. LIEN LAW § 10(1) (McKinney 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 29-2-106(a) (West 2007 &
Supp. 2010).
87 Mich. Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Dufty Rd. Props, 298 N.W.2d 923 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980) (citing Michigan mechanics’ lien law).  Relation back to the start of “visible” con-
struction is a common statutory provision throughout the country. See ALA. CODE § 35-11-
211 (1991) (“Such lien as to the land and buildings or improvements thereon, shall have
priority over all other liens, mortgages or incumbrances created subsequent to the com-
mencement of work on the building or improvement.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-33(b)
(2006) (“The claim is a lien on the land, building and appurtenances or lot or in the event
that the materials were furnished or services were rendered in the site development or subdi-
vision of any plot of land, then on the plot of land and the claim takes precedence over any
other encumbrance originating after the commencement of the services, or the furnishing of
any such materials . . . .”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1101 (1994) (“The lien shall be preferred
to all other liens or encumbrances which are subsequent to the commencement of the fur-
nishing of such labor, equipment, material or supplies by such claimant at the site of the
property subject to the lien.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.010(1) (West 2006) (“The lien on
the land or improvements shall be superior to any mortgage or encumbrance created subse-
quent to the beginning of the labor or the furnishing of the materials, and the lien, if asserted
as hereinafter provided, shall relate back and take effect from the time of the commencement
of the labor or the furnishing of the materials.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 570.1119(2)
(West 2007) (“A construction lien under this act shall take priority over all garnishments for
the contract debt made after commencement of the first actual physical improvement, with-
out regard to the date of recording of the claim of lien.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-5 (West
2004) (“The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as of, the time of
the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the structure or
improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which
may have attached subsequently to the time when the building, improvement or structure
was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on the ground . . . .”).
88 See statutes cited supra note 87.
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The relevant point, however, is that this relation-back concept means
mechanics’ liens can be surprise liens.  By permitting a lien to relate back to the
time of visible work or commencement, this doctrine creates a “dark period.”
This dark period does not expire until a potential lienor’s right to file expires
such that a non-filed lien may ultimately be deemed to attach at the commence-
ment of construction and thus be given priority over a subsequent bona fine
purchaser.89  The ostensible justification for this is to give contractors, laborers,
and material suppliers assurance that they will be protected from the first time
that they aid in the improvement of the property, but to balance this protection
against the interests of subsequently interested parties who can protect them-
selves by visibly inspecting the property.90  The potential for a surprise
mechanics’ lien is large, however.  Many, if not most, real estate transactions
involve some type of improvement or alteration to the relevant property, so
potential purchasers or secured parties must routinely confront the potential for
surprise liens created by these statutes.91
B. A Troubling Trend
This judicial and legislative acceptance and encouragement of surprise
liens constitutes a little-noticed, and troubling, trend.  Both the estate tax lien
and the relation back feature of mechanics’ lien laws demonstrate an explicit
willingness on the part of lawmakers to craft exceptions to real property record-
ing acts and the notice attributes widely believed to flow from them.
89 Some states have closed this dark period by cutting off a lienor’s rights upon a bona fide
purchase unless the purchaser had notice of the work performed. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 514.05; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10 § 3255(2).
90 See Edgar N. Durfee, Priorities, 57 MICH. L. REV. 459, 476-477 (1959). See also
Wineberg v. Moore, 194 F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (N.D. Cal. 1961) (discussing California com-
mon law regarding due diligence and constructive notice); infra Part IV.
91 See Jones & Messall, supra note 85, at 296-97.  Therein, the authors discuss in detail the
manner in which the title insurance industry has attempted to address the issue of surprise
mechanics’ liens that exist at the time the policy is issued, but do not gain visible priority
until a later time.  Among other things, they may do so by specifically excluding coverage
for mechanics’ liens
arising from an improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to [the date
the policy is issued and] not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured
by the insured mortgage which at [the date the policy is issued] the insured has advanced or is
obligated to advance.
Id. at 296 (quoting the 1970 policy form).  Such an exclusion speaks to work performed after
the date the policy is issued. Id. at 296-97.  Moreover, while an extended lender’s title
policy will cover mechanics’ liens of this nature, standard policies will not.  Telephone inter-
view with Jeffrey J. Jensen, President, Landmark Title Company (April 23, 2010).  An
owner’s policy does have broader coverage, but even these policies contain language that
arguably provides cover to insurers. Id.  In particular, a standard coverage ALTA policy
excludes matters not revealed by a review of the public records. See AMERICAN LAND TITLE
ASS’N, OWNER’S POLICY, EXCLUSION FROM COVERAGE 3(b) (2006) http://www.alta.org/
forms/index%20wide%20open.cfm (follow “ALTA Owner’s Policy” hyperlink).  This
arguably removes all responsibility for a mechanics’ lien. See, e.g., Hon Realty Corp. v.
First Am. Title Ins. Co., 291 Fed. App’x. 951, 953 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that an encum-
brance against title holder’s property was not covered by title insurance because it was not
reflected in public records at date of issuance of insurance).
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The justification behind these liens, in particular, suggests that the long-
standing statutory notice requirements discussed above are giving way to an ad
hoc series of normative decisions by judges and legislators as to whose inter-
ests are most consistent with the greater economic interests of society as a
whole.92  One possible reason for this is the stand-alone nature of real property
recording acts.  They act as “background” legislation that provides a general
rule that is easily subjected to state exceptions or federal preemptions.  They
are also among the oldest and most accepted series of statutes in America,93
and the generally non-controversial nature of their language and effect permits
incremental encroachments to take effect with little controversy or psychologi-
cal impact.
Whatever the reason, the two liens identified above are historically recent
constructs94 that are symbolic of a growing trend toward accepting surprise
liens.95  These liens are new and are assuming a more significant role in mod-
ern real estate law.  The potential reasoning behind this, and a critical analysis
of that reasoning, is set forth below.
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR SURPRISE LIENS
Why does the law increasingly condone surprise liens, in contravention of
the generally accepted standards and beliefs fostered by the historically general
application of state recording acts?  This section examines three potential justi-
fications.  Two of these—inefficiency of notice filing and disutility of notice
systems—have partial analogues in the context of hidden liens affecting per-
sonal property and have been the subject of substantial analysis in that con-
text.96  The third is put forward here for the first time and is based upon the
apparent economically favored status of the lienor.  Existing academic criticism
and a new application of the lessons learned from the recent financial crisis
effectively discredit the first two of these justifications.  This leaves lienor sta-
tus as the true basis for this rising trend—a conclusion with a number of poten-
tially troubling implications.
92 See infra Part IV.
93 See supra Part II.B.
94 See Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 331, 335 (1943) (establishing the estate
tax lien as a surprise lien); McConnell v. Mortg. Inv. Co. of El Paso, 305 S.W.2d 280, 282-
83 (Tex. 1957) (discussing the relatively recent genesis of mechanics’ liens as surprise
liens).
95 This trend, growing from its historical roots in maritime and forfeiture law, represents an
accelerating acceptance of these types of liens. See Gary F. Seitz, Interaction Between
Admiralty and Bankruptcy Law: Effects of Globalization and Recurrent Tensions, 83 TUL. L.
REV. 1339, 1358-59 (2009) (discussing maritime liens); Edward E. Sterling, Responding to
the Risks of Forfeiture (With Form), in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TITLE INSURANCE 445,
450 (Practising Law Institute ed.,1992) (discussing the history of “relation back” as it relates
to forfeiture and demonstrating the numerous instances wherein this concept has now been
statutorily accepted). See also In re Parr Meadows Racing Ass’n, 880 F.2d 1540, 1546-48
(2d Cir. 1989) (indicating that a New York county’s real property tax lien related back to a
prior date).
96 See generally Lipson, supra note 9, at 474-92.  Professor Lipson generally argues that the
law is increasingly abandoning notice-filing requirements applicable to personal property.
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A. Inefficiency of Notice Filing
The study of law and economics provides a potentially useful explanation
as to why the law permits surprise liens,97 and there has been significant analy-
sis utilizing this paradigm to attempt to determine whether secured credit and
notice filing are efficient.98  Broadly speaking, economic analysis of the law is
an approach to legal jurisprudence that applies microeconomic theories, such as
cost-benefit analyses, to legal issues.99  From a positive perspective, this can be
utilized generally to explain the development and current state of the law
regarding surprise liens.100  In this context, the question of why lawmakers
increasingly leave competing interest holders to their own devices is one that
centers on whether the government (in the form of real property recording acts)
or the free market (in the form of private contracts) will reach a better result.
The essence of this question, in turn, is whether the current system of real estate
lending and purchasing, as currently constructed around a publicly available
structure permitting both filing and review, is economically justifiable.101
The general nature of this examination is not new.  In particular, the Modi-
gliani-Miller Theorem (the M-M Theorem) has been the subject of substantial
analysis and application in this context102 and may suggest that the concept of
security and its concomitant notice filing may add little benefit to society.103
Broadly speaking, the M-M Theorem states that, in a perfect market, extraordi-
nary or special returns of capital cannot be generated by unique or specialized
capital structures.104  The thinking is as follows: if a debtor grants a security
interest in its assets to incentivize a lender to make a loan to it, other potential
creditors will charge more, due to the increased risk associated with lending to
a debtor whose assets are already encumbered.105  Whatever cost the debtor
might save by granting a security interest to the first creditor, or whatever other
97 See Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1167, 1168-69 (1997).  This mode of analysis began to gain widespread credi-
bility in the early 1960s, based largely on the work of Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi.
See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Guido
Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499
(1961).
98 See generally Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Pri-
orities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 (1979); David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency
of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for
the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997).
99 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 18-19 (2002).
100 Normative law and economics, on the other hand, makes prospective policy recommen-
dations based on economic consequences. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach
to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 768 (1975).
101 See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 98, at 1146-48.
102 See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of Dis-
tressed Corporations, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 45, 75 n.98 (1998). See generally Paul M.
Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989)
(applying economic analyses to secured transactions).
103 See Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance
and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261, 261-62 (1958); Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383
(1970).
104 See Modigliani & Miller, supra note 103, at 261-62.
105 Lipson, supra note 9, at 475-76.
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benefit he might garner from such an arrangement, is subsequently nullified by
the increased cost charged by later lenders.106  In other words, risk and return
calculations must be viewed across the complete chronological spectrum of an
enterprise, momentary attempts to alter or minimize current costs are ultimately
irrelevant, and a firm’s market value is ultimately independent of its capital
mix.107  Essentially, the M-M Theorem posits that secured credit is not neces-
sary to maximize a firm’s market value.
The wide acceptance of the M-M Theorem as a building block of financial
principle108 has led economic and legal theorists to suppose that traditional
filing systems that are fundamentally embedded in a system of secured credit,
such as the recording acts, make little economic sense.109  These systems are
designed to instill confidence in purchasers and bolster secured credit by
allowing creditors to confidently predict their interest in the collateral.  If
secured credit is not an essential element for efficient allocation of capital,
however, a filing system is of questionable value, and this is particularly so
given that filing systems have some clearly negative consequences.110
106 Id.
107 Modigliani & Miller, supra note 103, at 268-69.  The Efficient Markets Hypothesis
presents an economic analogy in the context of investment decisions.  This hypothesizes that
all public information is immediately reflected in stock price as soon as such information
enters an efficient market.  Fama, supra note 103, at 383.  Accordingly, above-average
returns are not possible based upon public information, and, even if they were momentarily
available, the market would immediately adopt the utilized method and so erode its value.
See Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 51 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 75, 76
(1995).  As applied to a secured financing system that utilizes, or is based upon, publicly
available information, a reduced interest rate afforded by a secured creditor will immediately
be offset by an increased interest rate demanded by a later creditor based upon the now-
increased risk of lending to an encumbered debtor.
108 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Importance of Priority, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1420,
1422 (1997) (“The bedrock of modern corporate finance is the Modigliani and Miller indif-
ference proposition.”).
109 See Lipson, supra note 9, at 476-78.
110 These negative consequences include the creation of negative externalities and the out-
right cost of such a system.  As to negative externalities, there is an argument that secured
credit actually fosters the very sort of harm, exposing creditors to undue risk, it is meant to
prevent by permitting debtors and sophisticated creditors to effectively cooperate to transfer
risk to less sophisticated parties and thus ultimately engenders distorted economic arrange-
ments. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 864 (1996).  This view posits that there
are many types of unsophisticated or non-intentional creditors, called “nonadjusting credi-
tors,” that cannot, or do not, demand higher interest rates in response to an effectively infer-
ior position behind secured creditors. Id. at 864-65.  The result of this imbalance of
perception or action is that debtors have a decreased incentive to monitor the type of genera-
lized risk that would most affect unsecured creditors because they do not pay a true price for
it. Id. at 934.  This potential distortion of behavior is arguably heightened by a notice filing
system, which gives nonadjusting creditors an outsized belief that they are adequately pro-
tected.  Such a view—essentially equivalent to believing that, because everyone else has
adequate information, everyone else is behaving appropriately and thus may serve as a
model for behavior—is a type of “pluralistic ignorance” wherein individual members of a
group privately reject a norm but assume everyone else accepts it and act accordingly.
Sandeep Gopalan, Say on Pay and the SEC Disclosure Rules: Expressive Law and CEO
Compensation, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 207, 215 (2008).  Such tacit belief ironically deepens the
lack of appropriate activity on the part of such creditors.  As to outright cost, there is a
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There have been various explanations and responses attempting to address
this skepticism, but these are not without significant theoretical weaknesses.  At
best, they constitute a tepid endorsement of traditional filing systems.111  These
substantial direct cost associated with the filing systems required by the reporting acts.  This
is because many of these systems have filing fees and ultimately serve as direct revenue
streams for county and other local governments. See, e.g., Lipson, supra note 9, at 484-85.
To the extent, then, that these acts and the notice provisions they assure do not benefit
anyone, they constitute simple rent seeking by governmental entities ever eager for more
revenue.  This would not be an original scheme.  Some of the earliest statutes relating to the
recordation of transfers of title to real property have been supposed to be largely, if not
primarily, motivated by Henry VIII’s desire for income. See James W. Bowers, Of Bureau-
crats’ Brothers-in-Law and Bankruptcy Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for
Information, 79 MINN. L. REV. 721, 731-32 (1995); see also supra note 28.
111 One potential explanation for the ongoing existence of secured lending, and its attendant
notice systems, is that incurring secured credit acts as an efficient method for the debtor to
“signal” to third parties that a company believes it enjoys good prospects. See generally
Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories,
10 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Security Interests]; F.H. Buckley, The
Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393 (1986); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan
Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989) [hereinafter Schwartz, Loan Priorities].  In other
words, secured lending does not benefit potential creditors by providing security so much as
it imparts critical information about potential debtors to potential creditors.  This theory is
somewhat impractical, however, as it assumes that creditors have perfect knowledge of
debtor risk appetite and ignores the substantial ambiguity that exists among the signals that
would be sent.  Schwartz, Security Interests, supra at 17-18.  This critical view of the ability
of a notice filing system to impart notice has been significantly advanced in the very eco-
nomic literature that has aired its potential existence and value. See id.  Schwartz’s Loan
Priorities article discusses the issue in terms of security interests attaching to personal prop-
erty, but this analysis is applicable to real property notice filing and the issues discussed in
this Article.  Therein, the author criticizes the potential value of the kind of signaling a notice
filing system might provide by theorizing about the ideal capital structure rational parties
would choose in an environment with perfect information. See Schwartz, Loan Priorities,
supra note 111, at 222.  Schwartz reviewed various forms and guides that provide examples
of secured financing documents and found a high incidence of covenants forbidding or
restricting later borrowing in general and securitization of debt in particular. Id. at 216-18.
The author’s experience with loan documents prepared by banks and other sophisticated
creditors anecdotally supports this view; such creditors systematically impose significant
restrictions on future activities and accompany such restrictions with complementary repre-
sentations and warranties and material, ongoing reporting requirements.  From the wide-
spread existence of such covenants, Schwartz concluded that theoretical lending
relationships would consistently afford creditors a rigid first-in-time priority wherein the first
creditor would generally enjoy priority over all later lenders. See id. at 213-19.  From there,
Schwartz theorized as to how creditors (in a hypothetical environment without notice filing
systems) would become aware of a first creditor’s first position. See id. at 219.  His answer
is that debtors would be incentivized to properly and fully inform third party creditors to
lessen their cost of capital. See id.  This incentive would arise because rational lenders
would assume that a material portion of all debtors are poor credit risks and would systemat-
ically demand a high interest rate, which generalized demand would cause good debtors
without prior debt or securitization to advertise themselves so that they could avoid paying
such high rates. Id. at 220.  Such advertising could occur on financial statements in the
context of the type of financial accounting (or lack thereof) associated with debt or on pub-
licly reported disclosures, if required by governmental rules and regulations. Id. at 220-21.
Regardless of the specific mode of communication, Schwartz argued that the type of incen-
tivized private disclosure he had identified was “both cheap and common” such that existing
modes of notice filing were unduly expensive and unnecessary with respect to the extension
of credit. Id. at 222.  Schwartz examined, and ultimately disregarded, the danger of surprise
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economic analyses and hypotheses, then, remain as theoretical criticisms of
secured credit, in general, and notice filing, in particular.112  Given the current
high regard in which economic analysis is held, and the widespread acknowl-
edgment of the theoretical underpinnings of these views, it is entirely conceiva-
ble that these criticisms have taken on a normative aspect and influenced
legislative and judicial lawmakers to either ignore existing discontinuities in
notice-provision systems or actively encourage them.113
B. Disuse of Notice Filing
Another argument against notice filing (and, as such, a potential justifica-
tion for the ongoing acceptance of surprise liens) is that potential users do not
actually utilize the system.114  With respect to potential creditors, recording
liens in such a true first-in-time system, logically extending his perception of debtors’ incen-
tive to fully communicate with potential creditors.  Such a desire and need for systemic and
adequate communication on an ongoing basis throughout the lifespan of an organization
would increase the difficulty of fraudulently hiding superior, undisclosed liens from search-
ing and perceptive creditors and would ultimately disincentivize any chicanery as such
behavior would inevitably affect subsequent opportunities and costs. See id. at 224.  Effec-
tively, then, Schwartz acknowledges a potential explanation for the ongoing vitality of notice
filing systems in credit markets in the face of the M-M Theorem but ultimately discards that
explanation and, in fact, deepens the existing economic criticism of filing systems.  Such
systems are inefficient and unnecessary because the market, fueled by rational incentives and
choices, would more cost effectively disclose the existence of liens. See id. at 224-25.
112 The focus of this economic analysis upon the efficacy of securitized lending transac-
tions, as opposed to purchasing transactions, does not lessen its potential impact on the
perception and treatment of notice filing systems in general.  First, animosity toward secured
lending necessarily bleeds into negativity toward filing systems, even if they could theoreti-
cally continue to serve a purpose with respect to purchasing transactions. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, Loan Priorities, supra note 111, at 223 (suggesting that economic incentives
would regulate creditor-debtor issues but that filing systems could be retained in order to
address conflicts relating to later buyers).  Thus, even if such criticisms only relate to one of
the primary roles of a notice filing system, such a view would inevitably lead to deemphasiz-
ing the importance of notice systems and their purported goals.  Second, these criticisms
apply just as forcefully to purchasing transactions.  The M-M Theorem posits that a com-
pany’s capital structure is ultimately irrelevant because creditors will demand higher interest
rates if prior investors are in a secured position.  This, in turn, leads to the supposition that
debtors will be sufficiently incentivized to provide adequate information to creditors such
that a government-run system of reporting lending security interests is unnecessary and inef-
ficient.  The same can be said of a purchasing transaction.  In the same sense that a creditor
should demand a higher interest rate if a debtor’s assets are encumbered, a buyer should
demand a lower price if the subject asset is encumbered.  As above, this generic demand for
a superior financial situation should incentivize sellers to render full and complete informa-
tion to prospective purchasers.  The vehicle for providing such information could be a
recording scheme, such as those currently in place, or a series of contractual undertakings or
indemnities.  In any event, such an economically driven type of voluntary disclosure would
moot any legal rules or requirements addressing surprise liens. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., An
Economic Analysis of the Duty to Disclose Information: Lessons Learned from the Caveat
Emptor Doctrine, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 123-125 (2008) (arguing that the doctrine of
caveat emptor is reemerging in the sale of real estate with respect to physical defects due to
potential informational symmetry).
113 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25, 27 (Aspen Publ’g, Inc. 5th
ed. 1998) (1972).
114 See Lipson, supra note 9, at 486-90.
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acts should convey valuable information regarding the current standing and
potential prospects of debtors, and, consequently, of the price of credit that
creditors should charge.  Some have suggested, however, that very few
unsecured creditors ever bother to examine publicly available notice records,
notwithstanding the theoretical value inherent therein.115
These types of creditors are referred to as “non-reliance creditors” and
include service and materials providers who interact with companies in an
ongoing manner (such as accountants, lawyers, utilities providers, etc.).116  It is
precisely these types of creditors—those who will never, or rarely, become
secured and will thus rely on the general reliability and creditworthiness of a
debtor—who logically stand to gain by examining the capital structure of a
debtor, but they seem not to do so.
An explanation for this apathy is that many of these types of small credi-
tors assume and hope that they will be paid from income produced in the ordi-
nary course of business.  Thus, they make the rational decision that the type of
due diligence associated with adequately examining notice records (such as a
county recorder’s records) does not provide a benefit justifying the cost.117
Such creditors rely on other pressures and on the general, observable quality of
the debtor’s business to ensure repayment.118
This lack of utility in a lending context creates a theoretical pressure upon
courts and legislatures to assign less importance and consequence to notice sys-
tems, in general, and recording acts, in particular, which ultimately demeans
concern about surprise liens.119  The same theoretical pressures exist in the
buying and selling context, although for different reasons.
In addressing the importance of conveying good title, modern real estate
transactional law has moved away from a singular reliance on title insurance,
which is based upon the notice systems fostered by the recording acts, and
toward contractual and common law obligations upon lenders and sellers to
provide good title.120  To be sure, one of the first steps of any modern real
115 Id.
116 See White, supra note 51, at 827-29.
117 See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1923-
24 (1994).
118 Id. at 1941.
119 This supposed lack of utility is not complete, of course.  Even in examining the perhaps
counterintuitive failure of simple creditors to utilize notice systems, most have acknowl-
edged that a still significant section of the credit community will continue to rely upon, and
benefit from, such a system.  Lipson, supra note 9, at 488.  This more sophisticated type of
creditor is one that is more likely to extend secured credit and that will certainly pay for title
insurance and UCC filing reports.  Thus, the argument is not that all notice-filing systems are
incorrigibly useless. Id. at 488-90 (discussing additional weaknesses in the argument that
notice filing systems are not used enough to justify their cost, including a lack of empirical
evidence for the argument; anecdotal evidence of such usage, even by less sophisticated
creditors; and the indirect usage of such systems by such creditors through reliance on credit
reporting services that do, themselves, use such systems).  Nevertheless, this is an additional
pressure, wrought in an economic cost-benefit analysis that theoretically provides cover to
lawmakers to suffer the existence of surprise liens.
120 The author bases this claim largely on personal experience and on extended conversa-
tions with colleagues and associates, all of whom note that this is a standard element of any
modern commercial transaction involving real property. See also, e.g., Gregory G. Gosfield,
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estate transaction is to pull a title report (almost always provided by a title
insurance company and based exclusively on public records) and examine it
carefully, searching for any hiccup or discontinuity of title.121  However,
another one of the first steps of that same transaction is to assiduously negotiate
over the covenants, warranties, and representations the seller will undertake and
make in connection with the sale.122  Among these are almost invariably
numerous undertakings relating to title; sellers, as a matter of course, contractu-
ally guarantee that good title will be conveyed.123
It is tempting to view these covenants and warranties merely as support
for, or “back up” to, the explicit insurance issued by a title insurer, but these
covenants and warranties are often of prime importance.  This is because title
insurers are generally subrogated to the rights of their insured counterparty.124
Accordingly, the title insurer protects the immediate purchaser but ultimately
seeks to transfer the cost of a title defect to the contractually bound party.  The
ultimate protection against such a defect, then, is the covenant or warranty
entered into or assumed by the seller and not the notice provided by real prop-
erty records.125
This growing apathy to such records and their importance to buyers and
creditors is further demonstrated by the recent advent of the Mortgage Elec-
tronic Registration System (MERS).  MERS is a privately owned and operated
A Primer on Real Estate Options, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 129, 155 (2000) (indicating
that a warranty of good title is a standard term in a bilateral real estate contract).
121 See, e.g., JAY D. MUSSMANE, PURCHASE/SALE OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY, at ch. VI
(2008).
122 See id. at 155.
123 This may occur either through a warranty and representation that explicitly survives the
consummation of the transaction, in accepted contravention of the common law doctrine of
merger, or in connection with the various covenants associated with various types of deeds.
See, e.g., Charles B. Sheppard, Assurances of Titles to Real Property Available in the United
States: Is a Person Who Assures a Quality of Title to Real Property Liable for a Defect in the
Title Caused by Conduct of the Assured?, 79 N.D. L. REV. 311, 322-23 (2003) (indicating
that a transferor under a warranty deed undertakes the following six covenants of title: (1)
the covenant of seisin, (2) the covenant of the right to convey, (3) the covenant against
encumbrances, (4) the covenant of warranty, (5) the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (6) the
covenant of further assurances).  These covenants inhere both in general warranty deeds and
in special warranty deeds, though they are, in the latter case, deemed to run from the trans-
feror only as to its own conduct—that is, the covenants do not cover title defects that exist
due to the acts of a predecessor to the transferor. Id.  Of course, not all sales involve war-
ranty deeds or full guaranties of title.  However, these transactions (often consummated with
a quitclaim deed) generally involve explicitly compromised property and are priced
accordingly.
124 See John D. Hastie, Real Estate Acquisition, Development and Disposition from the
Developer’s Perspective, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: MODERN REAL ESTATE TRANSAC-
TIONS, Aug. 13-15, 2009, at 40 (2009).
125 Interestingly, this is what one would expect under the M-M Theorem—although a sys-
tem of title insurance based upon the information made available in publicly available docu-
ments may have some function (here, as a mechanism for buyers to purchase a streamlined
ability to claim contractual rights), the true incentive to disclose title defects is with the
seller, who contractually undertakes to bear the cost of not having done so.  See supra Part
IV.A.
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database that tracks ownership and assignments of mortgages.126  Beginning in
the 1990s, the mortgage industry began to evolve to more widely spread the
risks incurred by, and benefits flowing to, mortgagees.127  One aspect of this
evolution was to separate the servicing of loans from the ownership of loans
and to separate the ownership of loans from the holder of the note.128  Under
traditional restrictions, these innovations could cause significant difficulties.
Historically, every time ownership of a mortgage loan was sold or transferred,
the parties had to prepare and record an assignment of the accompanying secur-
ity instrument to be recorded in the recording office where the real estate secur-
ing the loan was located.129  This was cumbersome, expensive, and often
caused confusion and chain of title problems.130
MERS was developed, in part, in response to these problems and in order
to streamline this process and simplify the steps required in connection with
it.131  In effect, it eliminated the need to draft and record a new assignment
each time a loan was sold, traded, or securitized, by creating a privatized, inter-
nal system that tracked this information for its members.132  Lenders and other
participants—MERS members—pay an annual fee and sign a contract with
MERS wherein they agree to abide by rules and restrictions promulgated by
MERS, and to appoint MERS as their agent with respect to registered mort-
gages.133  MERS is listed as the mortgagee of record, and members can thereaf-
ter buy and sell these registered mortgages among themselves without publicly
recording them, transferring the mortgages via MERS internal records pursuant
to contractually binding contracts.134  MERS remains as the nominee for the
new owner, regardless of how many different times the mortgage is pooled,
dissected, or sold.135  The recorded mortgage is never assigned on public
records, and the originally recorded mortgage retains its priority position pursu-
126 Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 63 CONSUMER FIN.
L. Q. REP. 262, 263 (2009).
127 See id. at 262.
128 Id.  The latter innovation is often associated with dividing the ownership of a loan, or a
pool of loans, among various owners. In such a situation, because there are multiple owners
of the same obligation, there is no manner in which all owners can hold the note.  This often
occurs in connection with the packaging of a mortgage into a mortgage-backed security for
sale to investors, none of whom ever hold the note, or even know who the borrower actually
is. See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and
the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 546-48 (2002) (indicating
the diversified and anonymous nature of the borrowers represented in mortgage backed
securities transactions).
129 See Mortgages: MERS and Foreclosures, REAL EST. L. REP., Oct. 2009, at 1, 1.
130 See id.  Multiple assignments, particularly of the same instrument to different parties,
may complicate title searches or even prevent a title insurance company from issuing title
insurance.  Additionally, the recording costs can quickly add up.  Recording costs for an
assignment often starts at $15-$30 for the first page and continues at $2-$3 per page thereaf-
ter.  Phillips, supra note 126, at 263.
131 See Phillips, supra note 126, at 263.
132 See id. at 263-64.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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ant to local recording laws.136  The entire process is without cost and remains
unknown outside the MERS system.  This system has grown exponentially in
fifteen years since its creation, and MERS claims that it is now the nominal
mortgagee on up to two-thirds of new residential loans in the country.137
MERS developed as a private-market response to perceived problems and
costs associated with the current public system, and represents a significant
detachment from real property notice filing, as it is commonly perceived.  This
calls into question the extent to which individuals and entities at every stage of
potential interest and concern—buyers, sellers, and creditors—can rely on, or
desire to rely on, the notice system currently in effect.138
These are indications that our notice filing systems are increasingly falling
into disuse.  Whether a result of passively ignoring available information, con-
tracting away the need to rely on notice systems, or a massive and recent inno-
vation meant to permit parties to avoid recording real property records, this
generic dissatisfaction and disuse of notice filing systems undermines the use-
fulness and utilization of our public recording system, and it may contribute to
the growing judicial and legislative acceptance of surprise liens that exist in
derogation thereof.
C. Lienor Identity
Another argument that may underlie the existence and emerging trend
toward the acceptance of surprise liens, presented herein for the first time, is
that certain lienors should enjoy favored status because granting such status to
these classes of creditors creates socio-economic benefit.  Based upon an exam-
ination of much of the authority that has passed upon, and permitted or excused
surprise liens, it appears clear that most courts and legislators are motivated by
a belief that those possessing surprise liens are more deserving of rights than
are good-faith purchasers.
With respect to the estate tax lien, recall that the seminal case establishing
the surprise nature of this encumbrance is Detroit Bank v. United States.139  As
discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court held that that the estate tax lien
imposed by the predecessor to § 6324 is not subject to any lien filing require-
ments.140  This reasoning, however, is strained.
136 This arrangement is sufficient in case of foreclosure as well.  Under common law, as a
nominee, or under the Uniform Commercial Code, as a transferee or as a holder of a note
indorsed in blank, MERS has standing to bring a foreclosure on behalf of the owner or
owners of a note in default. See, e.g., Mortg. Electronic Registration Sys., Inc. v. Foster, No.
2004-3956 (Fla. 4th Jud. Cir. Ct. Dec. 17, 2004); Mortg. Electronic Registration Sys., Inc. v.
Azize, 965 So. 2d 151, 154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
137 See Mortgages: MERS and Foreclosures, supra note 129, at 1; see also Phillips, supra
note 126, at 264.
138 Indeed, it has been argued that MERS does harm to “the accuracy of the public land and
court records databases, establishing in their place a proprietary national electronic registry
system that ‘tracks’ beneficial ownership and servicing rights and whose information is inac-
cessible to the public.” See Brief of Amici Curae South Brooklyn Legal Services et al. at 4,
MERSCORP, Inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 2004-04735).
139 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943).
140 Id. at 337.
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To reach its conclusion, the Court relied on its interpretation of the IRC’s
provision that explained when filing was necessary.141  The Court explained
that the filing requirement was set forth in a different statute that did not explic-
itly refer to the estate tax lien and that, as such, there was no indication that
Congress had wanted the filing requirement to apply to the estate tax lien.142
However, this requirement of a direct reference is nowhere in the relevant stat-
utory scheme, and is, in fact, contradicted by the language of the statutes at
issue.  Section 6323(a) provides that “[t]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall
not be valid as against any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic’s
lienor, or judgment lien creditor until [properly filed].”143  Section 6321 pro-
vides that, “[i]f any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the
same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States
upon all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to
such person.”144  On its face, § 6321 is unambiguous: it refers to “any tax.”
Because the estate tax is a tax, the Court could have concluded that estate tax
liens are subject to the filing requirement in § 6323(a).
Why, then, did the Court adopt its alternative reading of the statute?  To
some extent, the Court’s reasoning might be attributable to the historical ten-
sion between federal and state law.145  The Court might have been concerned
about imposing state filing requirements on a federal entity, the IRS.  However,
that tension ostensibly was resolved in favor of filing by the adoption of
§ 6323, so it seems likely that there is a deeper strain of reasoning behind
courts’ seeming unwillingness to hold the federal government to an apparently
clear filing requirement.
The answer may lie in the ancient rule of nullum tempus occurrit regi,
which means that “no time runs against the king.”  The rule is primarily applied
in American jurisprudence to prevent statutes of limitation and the doctrine of
laches from running against governmental entities.146  Although the original
141 Id. at 335-37.
142 Id.
143 I.R.C. § 6323(a) (2006).
144 I.R.C. § 6321 (emphasis added).
145 There was a lag time between the imposition of federal tax liens and the requirement that
these liens be recorded to be effective. See Detroit Bank, 317 U.S. at 334 (noting that the tax
lien was imposed in 1866 and that the filing requirement was imposed in 1913).  Due to the
preemption doctrine arising from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, this lack of a
filing requirement defeated the states’ recording laws. See, e.g., United States v. Vohland,
675 F.2d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Unless a federal statute requires a government tax lien
to be recorded, the unrecorded lien may be enforced against subsequent transferees.”).
146 See United States v. Hatfield, No. 94-50397, slip op. at 3 (N.D. Ill. April 2, 1996).  “The
U.S. Supreme Court has long held that ‘[w]hen the United States becomes entitled to a
claim, acting in its governmental capacity and asserts its claim in that right, it cannot be
deemed to have abdicated its governmental authority so as to become subject to a state
statute putting a time limit upon enforcement.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Summerlin,
310 U.S. 414, 417 (1940); Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 125
(1919)). This rule is derived from the rights of the English monarch, and, thereunder, “the
United States is not bound by state statutes of limitations or subject to the defense of laches
in enforcing its rights absent a clear manifestation of intent by Congress that the government
be so bound.” Id.
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reasoning behind this rule is antiquated,147 it has continuing application and
vitality in the deeply rooted “public policy of preserving public rights, reve-
nues, and property from injury and loss, [resulting from] the negligence of pub-
lic officers.”148  In other words, the courts are chary of the “public fisc,” even if
such protection effectively ignores long-accepted principles that apply to pri-
vate parties.149  This might explain the willingness of the Detroit Court to elide
the language of the federal tax lien filing statute: unless the federal government
specifically exposes itself to a procedural or substantive impediment—even
one as basic and widely accepted as filing—the courts are willing to permit the
government to ignore such rules.150  The key factor to this willingness is the
identity of the lienor; the courts view the economic value of the government’s
interests as sufficiently important to permit the creation of a surprise lien.
The same conclusion can be drawn with respect to mechanics’ liens.  As
discussed above, construction liens on real property developed as an analogue
to possessory liens available to mechanics and laborers who improved personal
property, beginning in the late eighteenth century.151  Although a number of
different influences probably contributed to the propagation of these liens via
legislation, the political clout of labor movements were likely the most signifi-
cant.152  Labor organizations and supporting political parties included construc-
tion liens as part of their platforms as a way to support the working class,
creating significant and widespread political pressure that resulted in all juris-
dictions adopting conforming laws within a relatively short period of time.153
This focus on the party entitled to the lien has not changed.  Modern stat-
utes vary as to the specific parties afforded rights,154 but, by definition, they
invariably grant rights to workers or material suppliers, and courts are quick to
147 Nearly 175 years ago, Justice Story indicated that the reason for the rule was asserted to
be that “the king is always busied for the public good, and, therefore, has not leisure to assert
his right within the times limited to subjects.” United States v. Hoar, 26 F. Cas. 329, 330
(C.C.D. Mass. 1821) (No. 15,373) (citing Justice Blackstone).
148 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938).
149 United States v. 93 Court Corp., 350 F.2d 386, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1965) (“The policy
underlying this exemption is that the failure of a government employee to bring an action
within the time prescribed by a state statute of limitations should not bar the government
from bringing the action if the action is one to enforce public rights or to protect the public
fisc. . . .  We believe the policy underlying this exemption to be generally salutary and we
decline to hold that Congress must specifically endow each government corporation it cre-
ates with an expressed exemption from the bar of statutes of limitations or from the defense
of laches.  The Supreme Court has never ruled that there is no presumption of immunity
when the United States is a plaintiff.”).
150 See Vohland, 675 F.2d at 1075 (“Whether or not [the estate tax lien could have been
filed pursuant to § 6323], it is clear . . . that filing [thereunder] is not a prerequisite to the
enforcement of a special estate tax lien against subsequent transferees.”).
151 See supra Part III.A.2.
152 Nelson, supra note 79, at 247-48.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 248-49.
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echo this sentiment.155  Their interests are viewed as being uniquely at risk and
so entitled to unique protection.156
However, that does not necessarily mean this protective motivation is
without wider consideration.  As with the courts’ focus on the social benefit
arising from a governmental right to surprise liens, the focus on the status of
materialmen and laborers relates to the perception that doing so benefits society
at large by incentivizing these individuals and entities to provide construction
services and activities at economically feasible prices.157
With respect to both of the surprise liens discussed herein, a review of the
judicial decisions and legislation creating and considering these encumbrances
creates a perception that lawmakers focus on the status of the party claiming
the lien.  This fixation seems based on a view that the goals of these parties
generally redound to the economic benefit of society as a whole.  An increasing
willingness of lawmakers to view liens from the perspective of the lienor, then,
and the supposed value such liens bring to society, helps explain the emergence
of surprise liens.
V. A REFUTATION OF SURPRISE LIENS
Inefficiency and disutility, two of the justifications for indifference or hos-
tility to notice filing systems examined above, do not withstand scrutiny.  These
justifications are worth considering here, as they reflect considered opinion
regarding lawmakers’ seeming ambivalence toward property notice filing sys-
tems, but these explanations are ultimately unpersuasive as the true driver of
the rising acceptance of surprise liens.  Both existing academic theory and
155 Indeed, the purpose of mechanics’ lien statutes, in general, and relation-back, specifi-
cally, is to benefit laborers and material suppliers.  Judicial affirmation of the special protec-
tions afforded to this class of person or business is legion. See Haselwood v. Bremerton Ice
Arena, Inc., 155 P.3d 952, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (indicating that the reason for
mechanics’ liens is to “prevent[ ] detriment to laborers and material suppliers” and that the
legislature enacted the relation-back scheme in order to “safeguard the interests of suppliers
and laborers”); Klein & Sons, Inc. v. Laudeman, 311 A.2d 780, 785-86 (Md. 1973) (“[F]or a
court to conclude that the resumption of work after a delay is a new project so as to prevent
the relation back of a lien for work and material subsequently supplied, it must bear in mind
that the purpose of the mechanics’ lien law is to protect the materialmen and that this law is
to be construed in the most liberal and comprehensive manner in their favor.”); S. Surety Co.
v. Chambers, 154 N.E. 786, 788 (Ohio 1926) (“[S]tatutes had been adopted in a number of
states for the purpose of giving special protection to materialmen and laborers engaged in
construction upon public buildings and public works, similar to that given them for work on
private buildings under the mechanic’s lien law.”); Richards v. Harman, 617 S.E.2d 556, 561
(W.Va. 2005) (“It is clear that in enacting the mechanics’ lien statutes . . . the Legislature
sought to protect any person who increases the value of another person’s real property by
furnishing labor or materials.”).
156 See Haselwood, 155 P.3d at 960 (“Relation-back statutes are necessary to protect build-
ers’ interests because a builder or supplier cannot record a lien to protect its interests until
the bill goes unpaid.”).  This begs the question, however, as to who, in the universe of
potential creditors, is not similarly handicapped, and why it is that this particular class of
creditor receives such legal aid and comfort. See infra Section V.
157 See Nelson, supra note 79, at 248.  Providing protected security was of particular con-
cern during the time when many lien laws were initially passed and when liquidity and credit
were far less available than today. See id. (citing FARNAM, supra note 79, at 153, 178).
168 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:139
some lessons from the recent financial crisis persuasively counter these argu-
ments, so this refutation leaves lienor status, and the economic significance
attached to that status, as the outstanding reason underlying the emerging trend
identified and discussed herein.
A normative examination of the lienor-status bias, however, persuasively
counters it as a sufficient justification for surprise liens.  Allowing certain clas-
ses of lienors the right to surprise liens ultimately imposes high individual and
social costs and runs counter to basic conceptions of fairness and social theory,
and such liens should not be tolerated.
A. Inefficiency & Disuse Refuted
The economic justifications set forth above amount to an argument that
certain individuals do not have sufficient economic incentive to rely on notice
filing systems and, therefore, they do not rely on such systems.  This lack of
reliance, in turn, suggests that judicial and legislative authorities need not be
overly concerned with the clear and efficient functioning of these systems and
so permit, or even encourage, the existence of surprise liens.  The perception
that creditors do not rely on notice filing systems is based primarily upon the
M-M Theorem’s supposition that a company’s capital structure is divorced
from its value because an already leveraged firm will have to pay proportion-
ately higher rates of return to new creditors, thus incentivizing debtors to accu-
rately communicate their existing leverage, including security interests granted
in their property.  This argument, however, is not without criticism.
In particular, the supposed detachment of capital structure from value pos-
ited by the M-M Theorem seems not to accurately reflect the manner in which
markets actually function.158  Of relevance here, the M-M Theorem assumes a
perfect capital market, wherein there are no taxes or transaction costs and all
information is free and simultaneously available to all market participants.159
This state clearly does not exist, so the M-M Theorem adapts itself to the exis-
tence of corporate taxes by supposing that, in a market wherein interest pay-
ments are deductible, the value of a firm’s true, post-tax value should increase
as its leverage does, because that type of capital is economically incentivized
through lower taxes.160  However, this necessary corollary to the M-M Theo-
rem is at odds with reality: leverage rates in the open market vary over a wide
range and generally do not approach the maximum suggested by the M-M
Theorem.161
158 See generally M.J. Gordon, Corporate Finance Under the MM Theorems, FIN. MGMT.,
Summer 1989, at 19.
159 See id.
160 See id.
161 See generally Merton H. Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261 (1977).  There are nu-
merous potential explanations for this.  For example, one explanation is to discount the
assumption that investors are indifferent as between corporate and personal leverage. See
Gordon, supra note 158, at 24-26.  Another is that the incentive of management and other
insiders to maximize net worth is not perfectly consistent with the incentive of outside inves-
tors to do the same and instead emphasizes long-term stability at the expense of appropri-
ately weighing and incurring current risks, which results in lower than theoretically
defensible leverage ratios. See Myron J. Gordon, Growth and Survival in a Capitalist Sys-
tem, 2 J. POST KEYNESIAN ECON. 433 (1980).
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That such a state exists means that the market is not perfectly responsive
to capital structure.162  The interest rate paid by creditors on debt does not rise
in direct relationship to the leverage of the firm, so debtors are not perfectly
incentivized to provide accurate information to potential creditors.163  As such,
a reliable notice system (such as a real property recording system) is required to
accurately convey this information.
This need, and its implicit contradiction of the non-reliance suggested by
the M-M Theorem, is further reinforced by events associated with the recent
economic and financial crisis.164  The crisis is often perceived to have been
triggered by a liquidity shortfall experienced by financial institutions, and to
have caused the collapse of numerous financial institutions, significant down-
turns in stock markets throughout the world, and a “credit crunch.”165  It is
considered by many to be the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression
and has often been referred to as the “Great Recession.”166  These difficulties
were instigated by a precipitous drop in U.S. housing prices, which had been
packaged into mortgage-backed securities and sold to investors at prices based
largely on reliance on the ratings and judgments of credit-reporting agencies.167
It is the nature of the housing stock underlying these mortgage backed securi-
ties and the role of the ratings assigned to these securities by credit rating agen-
cies (and the deference given the same by investors) that are relevant to our
analysis here.
There seems to be little disagreement that the United States experienced a
significant housing bubble between 2000 and 2005.  Homeownership rose from
67.5 percent of U.S. households in the fourth quarter of 2000 to 69.2 percent in
the fourth quarter of 2004,168 and home prices increased by 124 percent
between 1997 and 2006.169  More people were buying more homes, and those
homes were appreciating at great velocity.  This was particularly pronounced in
certain states, such as California, Florida, Arizona, and Nevada, where home
prices more than doubled between 2000 and 2006.170  Simply put, U.S. home
162 See Michael Bradley, Gregg A. Jarrell & E. Han Kim, On the Existence of an Optimal
Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence, 39 J. FIN. 857 (1984).
163 See Lipson, supra note 9, at 476-77.
164 The “recent economic and financial crisis” refers to the financial crisis the effects of
which began to be felt in 2007 and continue through the date of this Article.
165 See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM, 13-14 (2009).
166 See, e.g., Kathleen E. Keest, Consumer Financial Services Law and Policy: 1968-20??
In the Thick of the Battlefield for America’s Economic Soul, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087,
1090 (2010).
167 See POSNER, supra note 165, at 18-29.
168 ROBERT R. CALLIS & LINDA B. CAVANAUGH, U.S. DEPT. COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU
REPORTS ON RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND HOMEOWNERSHIP 4 (2007), available at http://
www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/qtr307/q307press.pdf.
169 CSI: Credit Crunch, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, at 4, available at http://www.econo-
mist.com/node/9972489?story_id=9972489.
170 Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks on U.S. Housing
Market before FDIC’s Forum on Mortgage Lending to Low and Moderate Income House-
holds (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1070.htm. See
also Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO.COM (Nov. 11, 2008), http://www.portfolio.com/
news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom/index2.
html (indicating that, while the historical ratio of median home price to income is 3:1, by late
2004, that ratio had risen to 4:1 nationally and 10:1 in Los Angeles and 8.5:1 in Miami).
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prices in the first half of the 2000s were overvalued at an untenable and histori-
cal level,171 and a significant proximate cause of this economically unjustifi-
able expansion of pricing was the behavior of secured lenders.172
Traditionally, long-term lending secured by real estate was a low-risk
banking activity.  This was because, if the debtor defaulted, the creditor could
seize the real estate, sell it, and recover its debt.173  If the value of the real
estate fell, the creditor might not be able to collect an amount equal to its loan,
but this risk was generally minimized by only lending a relatively safe percent-
age of the purchase price of the real estate and only lending to creditworthy
debtors.174  For a variety of reasons, however, institutional lenders, such as
banks, became very willing in the early 2000s to engage in “subprime lend-
ing.”175  This is essentially high-risk lending and involves lending more money
to more people with respect to more properties.176
Indeed, throughout this period of time, lenders seemed intent on inventing
methods of lending to previously unworthy debtors.177  They lent to debtors
with bad credit and no proof of income, and created adjustable-rate mortgages
designed to defer interest payments for as long as possible.178  So it was that
secured lenders—those bastions of economic sanity whose stalwart demand for
justifiable compensation based upon conservative views of risk and reward—
171 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 14 (Broadway Books 2d ed. 2005) (2000)
(likening housing appreciation to a “rocket taking off” and indicating that only the post-
World War II boom can compare with the rate of home appreciation witnessed between 1997
and 2004).
172 Though there is, of course, a substantial amount of blame to go around with respect to
the housing bubble and the accompanying crisis. See POSNER, supra note 165, at 1-40.
173 Id. at 20.
174 Id.
175 See id. at 21-25.  The causes of bank behavior during this period have been subject of
much speculation, including that by Judge Posner, who suggests that part of the cause is due
to regulatory changes that effectively altered the financing landscape and so encouraged
these practices.  Others posit that governmental policies artificially inflating the incentive of
banks to lend to certain groups also contributed to this state of affairs. See, e.g., Carol D.
Leonnig, How HUD Mortgage Policy Fed the Crisis, WASH. POST, June 10, 2008, at A1.
Still others believe that all investors are subject to psychological pressures that lead to over-
investment (in tulips, stocks, or mortgage backed securities) and the inevitably consequent
bubble and crash cycle.  These theories and hypotheses focus on banks, but are effectively
determinative as to the entire lending community as banks create the environment in which
all lenders exist.  The true cause, or true combination of causes, of this behavior by lenders is
outside the scope of this Article.
176 See POSNER, supra note 165, at 21-29.
177 In 2000, there was $130 billion in subprime lending with $55 billion securitized as mort-
gage bonds.  By 2005, there was $625 billion in subprime lending with $507 billion securi-
tized as mortgage bonds.  Lewis, supra note 170.  By 2006, as much as 40 percent of the $3
trillion mortgage market may have been to subprime or other high risk borrowers. POSNER,
supra note 165, at 25.
178 See Lewis, supra note 170 (“In Bakersfield, California, a Mexican strawberry picker
with an income of $14,000 and no English was lent every penny he needed to buy a house
for $720,000.”).  Some of these loans were even called “NINJA loans”—No Income, No
Job, No Assets.  Others were based on the debtor’s claim as to its income or assets.  These
“stated income” loans were euphemistically referred to as “liar’s loans,” bringing to mind
Modigliani’s belief that all creditors would assume that all debtors are liars, though with
very different consequences than he had forecast.
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abandoned any semblance of cost-benefit analysis and essentially competed for
the chance to advance funds to risky debtors in a seemingly indefensible race to
the bottom.  This lending environment metastasized until 2007, at which point
the current crisis began to reveal itself.179
This is not, of course, what one would expect based upon the M-M Theo-
rem.  Under this worldview, one expects creditors to so carefully scrutinize
potential debtors that they collectively incentivize debtors to provide full, fair,
and accurate information regarding their assets in a market-based, and hence
economically efficient, manner.180  That clearly did not occur.  Instead, lenders
required very little information and put very little pressure on debtors.  Indeed,
in a seemingly inverse perversion of the M-M Theorem, exactly the opposite
pressures came to bear; rather than debtors being pressured by an acute need to
satisfy lenders in order to raise capital, creditors seemed to be pressured to lend
money to debtors under riskier and riskier conditions.  There was, then, no real
pressure on debtors to create an efficient notice system, as creditors accepted
less and less, and worse and worse, due diligence.
Whatever the cause for this conflagration of theoretical incentives, at least
one conclusion seems unavoidable: creditors and purchasers do require a notice
system to gather verifiable information, and creditors cannot be relied on (at
least in the present market and regulatory environment) to pressure debtors to
provide accurate information of their own accord.  As such, in the absence of
an objective and independently administered system, lenders and purchasers
may well abandon all caution and forego the type of meaningful due diligence
that protects the market.
Additionally, there is reason to believe that creditors will rely on such an
objective and independent system when it is available.  In contravention of the
second potential explanation for the law’s acceptance of surprise liens—that
creditors do not use notice systems even when they are available—we can
again turn to recent events.
The purchasers of the mortgage-backed securities referenced above (the
ultimate creditors) relied on credit-rating agencies to tell them the quality of
their investments.181  These securities are complicated things, aggregating hun-
dreds or thousands of individual mortgages, and then separated into different
tranches that dictate the order of repayment (i.e., investors in the first tranche
get repaid first).182  Theoretically, credit-reporting agencies would assign the
first tranche a higher rating (with the highest rating being a risk-free triple-A
rating) indicating a very high degree of safety because it was believed that there
179 See POSNER, supra note 165, at viii.
180 As discussed above, the M-M Theorem should apply to potential buyers, as well. See
supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.  This is particularly so where the creditor is a
secured lender with respect to real estate, as the primary remedy available to such a lender is
the ability to foreclose upon the real estate securing the loan.  In effect, then, these creditors
are effectively entering into a potential purchase transaction, where their analysis of the
quality of the debtor’s assets should encompass both the debtor’s future prospects and the
potential utility of owning the real estate at issue.
181 See Felix Salmon, The Secret Formula That Destroyed Wall Street, WIRED MAGAZINE,
March 2009, at 74, 77-79, available at http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/wp
_quant?currentPage=all.
182 See id. at 77.
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was no way that all of the relevant homeowners would default on their loans at
the same time (which is effectively what would be required for the owners of
the first tranche to lose their investment).183  Subsequent tranches, or securities
constituted from poor loans, would receive lower ratings and deliver a higher
return due to their increased risk.184
These credit ratings served the same function that title searches in county
records or UCC filing reports mean to serve—providing potential creditors
with accurate information about the current state and future prospects of a
potential debtor or the economic attributes of a seller.185  Indeed, these ratings
are the M-M Theorem in play—the manifestation of a debtor’s need to provide
a creditor or buyer with the type of information the creditor or buyer needs in
order to provide the credit or consummate the purchase desired.  Unfortunately,
these market-based notices proved manifestly insufficient.186  More troubling
here, though, is that creditors arguably had sufficient reason to know that these
were insufficient, even as they were relying on them.187  There was widespread
distrust and significant criticism of these ratings throughout the entire period
under consideration, but that did not stop the credit market from expanding
until the underlying mortgages began to default at unexpectedly high rates.188
In other words, creditors did look for notice, but they ultimately relied on a
system that was overtly inadequate.
This review of the information sought and gathered by secured real prop-
erty creditors reinforces the view that credible notice systems are necessary to
an efficiently functioning lending and purchasing environment.  Without them,
183 See id.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 77-79.  As discussed therein, part of the difficulty in assigning a triple-A rating
to a mortgage backed security was that while it was generally unlikely that a whole cross-
section of homeowners would suffer the kind of individual setback that would cause default
(illness, job loss, etc.), there are risks (such as a decline in values, which is due to propagat-
ing, market-based influences) that do affect a large number of people at once.  This concept,
called correlation, means that certain types of risk reverberate throughout a pool of risk, and
is important in determining the overall quality of the tranche in question.  For many years,
this risk was too difficult to quantify, so the ratings conservatively valued this type of invest-
ment.  In 2000, however, Dr. David X. Li published a paper hypothesizing that the risk of a
mortgage-backed security could be tied to the market for credit default swaps (here, a deriva-
tive tied to the market’s estimate of an underlying default).  Dr. Li posited a formula—the
Gaussian Copula Formula—that did this in a mathematically defensible manner that pro-
vided the rating industry with a theoretical tool to assign historically positive ratings.  And it
did so with gusto, bundling and securitizing almost any type of obligation and turning it into
a triple-A security.  Indeed, the agencies often assigned triple-A ratings to tranches even if
none of the component obligations were themselves of that quality. See also Lewis, supra
note 170 (“Wall Street investment banks took huge piles of loans that in and of themselves
might be rated BBB, threw them into a trust, carved the trust into tranches, and wound up
with 60 percent of the new total being rated AAA.”).
187 See Salmon, supra note 181, at 77-79 (indicating that, even before the dissemination of
ratings based on the Gaussian Copula Formula, there was significant criticism of attempts to
correlate financial quantities and that, even during its use, there was a widespread belief that
it was not suitable for risk valuation). See also Lewis, supra note 170 (“We always asked
the same question,” says Eisman.  “Where are the rating agencies in all of this?  And I’d
always get the same reaction.  It was a smirk.”).
188 See Salmon, supra note 181, at 79.
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creditors will either permit debtors to engage in widespread chicanery or rely
on questionable market-based provisions of information.  Additionally, even if
creditors and buyers are not directly relying on the notice filing systems availa-
ble to them, they are likely relying on information that intermediaries who do
(or should) rely on such systems have.189  Title insurers and rating agencies
might save creditors from having to directly examine security filings, but those
companies themselves rely on such filings.  Similarly, MERS is only useful
after the mortgage has been recorded in the property-recording system because
it relies upon established notice filing systems to secure the priority and integ-
rity of the mortgage and only thereafter allows members to buy and sell among
themselves.190
Accordingly, there is little actual validity to the theoretical idea that credi-
tors should not require a real property filing system or that they do not rely on
the current systems available to them.  This refutation, and the essential eco-
nomic facts underpinning it, indicates that these arguments, while theoretically
interesting, are not the true drivers behind the rise of surprise liens.
B. Lienor Identity Refuted
If economic theory does not provide a reasoned basis for allowing surprise
liens, lienor identity remains as the relevant justification.  As set forth above, it
appears that lawmakers have focused on lienor identity due to a belief that the
activities or goals of these particular lienors create a wider economic and social
benefit.191  This conclusion leads to a focused line of analysis as to whether
surprise liens truly accomplish their purpose of creating wider social benefit.
They do not.
From an economic standpoint, status-driven surprise liens focus solely on
the lienors at issue, in the circumstances at issue, and ignore the wider systemic
costs inherent in such liens.  From an equitability standpoint, these liens contra-
vene established principles and mores present in our legal and social system,
and so offend basic notions of ethics and fairness, particularly in light of the
189 See LoPucki, supra note 117, at 1941.
190 See Phillips, supra note 126, at 263-64.
191 See supra Part IV.C.  This presents an interesting contrast with priming liens.  Such
priming liens explicitly attach after the interest that is subsequently overcome. See, e.g., In
re Huber Contracting, Ltd., 347 B.R. 205, 216 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2006) (“[P]riming liens
. . . truly arise and attach after another validly recorded lien such that the lien has equal or
superior rights in the same collateral.”).  Effectively, then, such liens constitute a type of
taking. See Richard A. Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholarship?, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 635, 640 (1978) (defining a taking of property as “[a]ny diminution of rights in the
bundle of any holder, no matter what becomes of those rights”).  The focus in such cases is
an explicitly normative one on which a party “should” have the property given the relative
equities of the parties involved and the specific benefits accruing to the “primed” party. See
generally Robert S. Bozarth, Environmental Liens and Title Insurance, 23 U. RICH. L. REV.
305 (1989); Jarrod B. Martin et al., Freefalling with a Parachute that May Not Open:
Debtor-in-Possession Financing in the Wake of the Great Recession, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1205 (2009).  These constitute direct and frank decisions by legislators that a primed party is
appropriately deprived of its interest.  Surprise liens, on the other hand, are more subtle
deprivations of rights and focus on society-wide costs and benefits, as opposed to the rights
of the parties directly involved.
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long-standing and widely accepted nature of the information and rights
imparted by real property recording acts.
1. Economic Arguments Against Surprise Liens
Lawmakers increasingly accept the existence and usage of surprise liens
by certain types of lienors because they believe permitting such persons or enti-
ties this special right redounds to the economic benefit of society as a whole,
while only negatively affecting a discrete number of ostensible title holders.192
However, this belief is ultimately incorrect.  Surprise liens undermine the infor-
mational role that determinate property rights and expectations play, creating
systemic costs borne by society at large.  These costs must be balanced against
the economic benefits supposedly wrought by such liens.
a. The High Cost of Hidden Property Rights
Surprise liens undermine notice filing and the informational role it plays in
society.  This role is effectively a proxy one, supporting and sustaining that role
served by property law as a whole.193  Property has conservatively been
defined as “that [s]ole and de[s]potic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of
any other individual in the univer[s]e.”194  This conception of property rights
focuses upon the in rem nature of property—rights are defined with respect to
an actual, concrete thing.195  Some have interpreted this as creating impersonal
and non-specific duties, absent from flexible personal rights, that are concretely
and universally “broadcast to the world from the thing itself.”196
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, in particular, have elaborated upon the
role and nature of property rights in effectively and efficiently conveying infor-
mation to society as a whole.197  Merrill and Smith argue that such a specific
and clear set of duties attaching to “everyone else” permits people to clearly
perceive rights and obligations and to economically arrange their plans.198
However, this clear perception of rights arises because the law imposes a sig-
nificant burden on essentially everyone, including third parties who presumably
have no need to understand the rights and responsibilities of parties to a con-
tractual arrangement.199  Such a burden is possible only so long as property
remains relatively simple and standardized so that “everyone else” can under-
stand the rights flowing from it easily and with little cost.  This general limita-
192 See supra Part IV.C.
193 See Lipson, supra note 9, at 438-40.
194 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (photo reprint,
William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1992) (1766).
195 This traditional view of property, echoed by Adam Smith and Jeremy Bentham, may be
contrasted with the more recent view of property rights as a more malleable “bundle of
rights.” Compare ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 9-86 (R.L. Meek et al. eds.
1978), and JEREMY BENTHAM, THE LIMITS OF JURISPRUDENCE DEFINED 164 (1945), with
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 370 (1954).
196 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Eco-
nomics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 359 (2001).
197 See generally id.
198 Id. at 359.
199 Id.
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tion is known as the “numerus clausus” (meaning “closed number”) and posits
that “[a]ll modern property systems limit the forms of ownership and standard-
ize property along many dimensions.”200  Merrill and Smith believe that courts
and scholars generally honor this conception of property despite their protesta-
tions to the contrary:  “They treat previously-recognized forms of property as a
closed list that can be modified only by the legislature.”201
By honoring this concept of numerus clausus (that is, by restricting prop-
erty rights to a fixed number of forms), the law effectively guards against the
extraordinary informational costs that would flow from recognizing the unend-
ing number of unique property rights that parties would develop of their own
accord:202
Limiting the number of basic property forms allows a market participant or a poten-
tial violator to limit . . . inquiry to whether the interest does or does not have the
features of the forms on the menu.  Fancies not on the closed list need not be consid-
ered because they will not be enforced.203
This standardization lowers the cost of determining the nature of the property
rights at issue and so economically benefits society as a whole.204
The relevance here of the conception of limited property rights and their
value to society is that notice systems support this efficiency by “channel[ing]
transaction forms in ways that pure contract would not.”205  Parties and their
lawyers, ever mindful of the settled manner in which property interests are
recognizably and reliably defined and described in notice systems, likely struc-
200 Id. at 385 (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the
Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000)).
201 Merrill & Smith, supra note 200, at 10-11.
202 See id. at 25.  Citing the case of Keppell v. Bailey, (1834) 39 Eng. Rep. 1042 (Ch.),
Merrill and Smith call such unique property rights “fancies.”
203 Id. at 33.  “Perhaps the key point about the numerus clausus is informational: The forced
standardization of property forms creates a kind of shorthand which, in turn, reduces infor-
mation costs.”  Lipson, supra note 9, at 497.  Put differently, different people with different
rights to a single asset “need some means of assuring that they share a common understand-
ing of those rights.”  Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verifi-
cation: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
373, 382 (2002).  Without that understanding, there is potential for the parties to “mistakenly
make inconsistent uses of the asset or underuse the asset” or to misallocate resources due to a
fear that “the other will . . . opportunistically assert rights that properly belong to the other.”
Id.  A failure to reach such a common understanding will result in the parties taking costly
actions to protect their rights, and in a general discouragement in improving and using assets.
See id.
204 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 200, at 33.  This leads to the conclusion that there is a
preferred balance as to the economically appropriate number of recognizable property forms.
See id. at 39-40.  Measurement and error costs would be lowest, for example, in a fixed
system that only recognizes a single type of property interest. See id.  “On the other hand,
by grandfathering in existing forms of property, and permitting legislative creation of new
forms, the numerus clausus permits some positive level of diversification in the recognized
forms of property.” Id. at 40.
205 Lipson, supra note 9, at 496.  Professor Lipson identifies the nature and import of prop-
erty rights in general, and the numerus clausus in particular, and indicates the supporting role
that notice filing plays with respect to the same, in the context of personal property notice
filing.  The concept applies to real property records, and the harm done to them by surprise
liens, as well. See id. at 496-501.
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ture their transactions in conformance with settled tradition and history.206
Surprise liens undermine this supporting role by weakening the importance and
effectiveness of notice systems.207
“To the extent we abandon notice filing, therefore, we . . . drive up the
cost of obtaining information about the types of, and interests in, property.”208
In other words, surprise liens, such as those considered herein, create an ambi-
ent cost to society as a whole by fostering uncertainty as to the nature of prop-
erty rights held by others and so increase the costs generally required to
discover the same.
b. A Questionable Allocation of Rights
Permitting surprise liens also functions as a questionable reallocation of
the rights that the parties themselves established in the context of generally
accepted notions of notice and fairness.  Initially, the perceived costs incident
to this ostensibly beneficial shifting of rights seems relatively small.  This is
because they appear to fall solely upon the surprised party, and even those costs
appear largely compensable to true bona fide purchasers or purchasers with
adequate title insurance.  Both of these consolations, however, do not withstand
scrutiny, and, upon more careful consideration, it becomes clear that sanction-
ing surprise liens actually creates significant individual and societal costs.
First, the perception that surprised parties have effective redress for their
loss is false.  Superficially, this belief may appear true because a bona fide
purchaser subject to a surprise lien likely has some sort of private redress to the
party from which it received the asset.209  However, this apparent ability to be
206 See id. at 496.  Professor Lipson bases his claim on personal experience and personal
discussions.  The author echoes this claim, based upon his own practice and that of his
partners and colleagues.  It is conceivable that a purchaser of real property, or a creditor
securing a loan in real property, will either create a unique real property interest or describe a
traditional interest in a new and unique manner, but doing so in the context of the real
property recording acts creates a significant risk that others will not understand the intent of
the parties to the contract, and so will not be put on notice as to the relevant party’s property
interest.  Such a risk generally serves as adequate incentive to stay within the accepted
bounds of traditional property law.
207 This view of the numerus clausus is subject to some criticism. See generally Hansmann
& Kraakman, supra note 203.  Therein, the authors argue that substantive property rights are
not limited, but that the manner in which rights holders put others on notice is.  They agree
that there is a connection between property rights and notice, but disagree as to the mode and
manner in which this notice is communicated. Id. at 174-75.
208 Lipson, supra note 9, at 496.
209 See, e.g., Holzworth v. Roth, 101 N.W.2d 393, 395 (S.D. 1960) (discussing liability of
grantor to grantee with respect to claimed mechanics’ lien).  This is not universal, however.
If the grantee took the real property by means of something less than a warranty deed—i.e.,
a quitclaim deed or a bargain and sale deed—then the grantee may have no claims against
the grantor.  Such a situation may not inspire economic solicitude, however, as it is likely
that purchasers under such circumstances paid an overtly compromised price for such title,
and are not, therefore, truly deprived of their “bona fide” price.  Moreover, grantees may
have other common law claims or claims against others further up the chain of title. See,
e.g., Gawron v. Robert Dev. Corp., 107 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Mich. 1961) (holding that a
seller’s covenant to pay all taxes and assessments that were a lien on the land at date of
contract survived closing); Estate of O’Neal v. United States, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1290 (N.D.
Ala. 2002) (considering a transferee claim against an estate for restitution arising from
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made whole is extremely misleading because it ignores both the possibility that
the prior owner lacks sufficient resources and the costs inherent in any litiga-
tion required for a surprised owner to recover from a prior owner.
As to the prior owners’ resources, little can be said with certainty other
than there will be some portion of cases where the prior owner does not have
the resources to make the new owner whole on account of the surprise lien.210
Whatever this portion is, it lowers the effective remuneration available to sur-
prised owners.  Moreover, even if the prior owner does have sufficient
resources, reaching them likely involves the expenditure of significant
resources in litigation.  And litigation constitutes a significant transaction
cost.211  This further erodes the effective redress available to surprised owners
and weakens the argument that the individual costs are not significant.
The argument that the cost of shifting the ownership rights is isolated to
the parties affected also fails.  One reason for this failure is that the litigation
costs identified above also accrue to society at large.212  The American system
of justice requires public expenditures on judges, court employees, physical
facilities, and all the other elements of the court system.213  By encouraging
litigation, surprise liens ultimately encourage these types of social costs.  Sur-
prise liens also cause widespread costs in that they increase the title insurance
premiums paid by every party purchasing such insurance.  Surprise liens, of
course, affect the condition of title, so—although there is some question as to
whether this coverage customarily covers surprise liens such as the ones dis-
cussed herein214—there is no question that title insurers pay some portion of
the losses incurred due to surprise liens or, at least, pay the litigation costs
§ 6324 liability of transferee).  Based upon anecdotal evidence, the author can confirm that
IRS revenue agents do, in the context of a § 6324 surprise lien, view the potential claims of a
surprised owner as a type of “just compensation” that largely removes the burden of the tax
lien.
210 Based upon the author’s personal experience, this is not a small portion of the time.
Prior owners often utilize a significant portion, or all, of the proceeds arising from sales to
pay off secured loans on the property sold, which proceeds are not theoretically reachable by
the new owner.  Additionally, in the commercial context, many sellers are corporate or busi-
ness entities, which often immediately, and irrevocably, disburse the proceeds of sale upon
closing.
211 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 306, 330-33 (1986) (identifying and discussing three types of transaction costs
associated with litigation: (1) agency costs, (2) litigation costs, and (3) costs to society);
Robert M. Ackerman, Tort Law and Communitarianism: Where Rights Meet Responsibili-
ties, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 649, 687-88 (1995) (discussing the burden on the community
imposed by tort and commercial litigation).
212 See Ackerman, supra note 211, at 688.
213 Id.
214 See supra note 73.
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associated with defending against them.215  These costs are necessarily passed
through to all consumers of title insurance, in the form of higher premiums.216
Thus, surprise liens do, in fact, create significant costs that are born both
by the surprised owner and by society in general.  There is no reason to believe
the supposed benefits such liens create outweigh these costs, so lawmakers’
willingness to reallocate property rights in the face of general expectations is a
questionable one.
2. The Equitable and Ethical Argument Against Surprise Liens
Even if the economic benefits engendered by permitting certain lienors the
ability to use surprise liens do outweigh the costs created by surprise liens (a
proposition that is not by any means clear),217 one must still consider the equi-
table and ethical issues inherent in permitting surprise lienors to trump the
interests of bona fide title holders.
From an equitable perspective, the law has consistently found such liens to
be unfair.  Surprise liens defeat the legitimate expectations of bona fide pur-
chasers218 and so create significant uncertainty.219  There is a deep resentment
of the costs caused by this uncertainty, and such liens have often been viewed
as little more than outright fraud.220  This belief arises from basic conceptions
of fairness and due process.  Constitutional due process is meant to protect
against arbitrary deprivations of property,221 and sanctioning and enforcing
liens absent public notification seems to conflict with justified expectations and
to generally deprive people of their legitimate property rights, whether arising
215 See Murray, supra note 4, at 59 (noting that the duty to defend is broader than the duty
to indemnify and is invoked if a claim “is arguably covered by the insuring provisions of the
policy.”); see, e.g., Chic. Title Ins. Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 172 F.3d 601 (8th Cir.
1999) (involving a title insurance company indemnifying an owner against mechanics’
liens); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. United States, No. 04-429, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Wash.
May 12, 2005) (involving a title insurance company indemnifying an owner against a § 6324
lien).
216 Title insurance is unlike other types of insurance in that it does not underwrite on a risk
assumption basis. See Robert S. Bozarth, Commercial Mortgage Finance: Title Insurance
Issues and Endorsements—Multi Site Issues, in TITLE INSURANCE 2005: MASTERING CRITI-
CAL ISSUES FACING BUYERS, SELLERS & LENDERS 291, 294 (Practising Law Institute ed.,
2005).  In other words, the insurer is not guided by actuarial tables or mathematical compu-
tations of loss expectancy.  Instead, it relies on title research to eliminate extant risk. See id.
Nevertheless, title insurance companies are required to reserve for loss and must include
their expected losses in the cost of their policies. See Janet A. Alpert, Trends and Transfor-
mations in the Title Industry, in TITLE INSURANCE 1996: THE BASICS AND BEYOND 377, 383
(Practising Law Institute ed., 1996).
217 There is no indication that any empirical or even focused study or analysis has been
attempted or completed along these lines.
218 See supra note 12.
219 See Jeffrey Davis, Fixing Florida Execution Lien Law, 48 FLA. L. REV. 657, 657-58
(1996); see also In re Badger Lines, Inc., 199 B.R. 934, 939 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1996)
(“Secret liens can only produce uncertainty for potential, unsuspecting creditors . . . .”).
220 See Richard L. Barnes, Reaffirming the Dominance of Notice in Article 9: A Proposed
Modification of Priorities in Returned and Repossessed Goods, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 353, 385
(1987)
221 Michele L. Jacobson, Rico Post-Indictment Restraining Orders: The Process Due
Defendants, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1162, 1165 (1985).
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from a governmental surprise lien or from state-sanctioned enforcement of a
private surprise lien.
As explained above, the courts have generally eschewed this approach by
finding surprise liens to be explicitly constitutional.222  However, this view is
not monolithic.223  Indeed, constitutional due process is implicated in connec-
tion with a plethora of rights,224 so it is not unreasonable that many view the
basic contours of this right as at least tangentially connected with the idea that
surprise liens act as an effective deprivation of property without notice.
Regardless of the precise connection, there is a general and legitimate expecta-
tion in our system of governance and jurisprudence that property rights are
entitled to the well-known benefits of adequate notice and fair hearing.225  This
expectation, and the rights underlying it, convincingly argues against permit-
ting surprise liens absent a strong countervailing interest.
Moreover, from an ethical perspective, there is a strong argument that
society should discourage surprise liens.  These liens are, by definition, secret
because they prevent a clear and accurate appraisal of the value of property.
This seems problematic, and this conclusion is both intuitively appealing and
credible.  It is credible because it derives from a concrete analysis of social
ethics theory focusing on utilitarianism and the work of John Rawls and John
Harsanyi.226
Initially, the overt appeal of accuracy may appear to arise from the theory
of utilitarianism.  Under this theory, society should focus on maximizing social
utility.227  This involves preventing people from purchasing the “wrong” prop-
erty, because misguided purchases undermine both individual and societal util-
ity.228  As such, accurate information, and the accurate pricing that flows from
222 See supra note 71, discussing Sessler v. United States, 7 F.3d 1449 (9th Cir. 1993). See
also Laurel E. Lockett, Environmental Liability Enforcement and the Bankruptcy Act of
1978: A Study of H.R. 2767, the ‘Superlien’ Provision, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 859,
882 (1984) (acknowledging that secret liens appear to violate due process requirements but
concluding that they “have been found constitutionally acceptable.”).
223 See, e.g., Lanterman v. Luby, 114 A. 325, 327 (N.J. 1921) (holding that if the statute
there at issue had “expressly included subsequent innocent purchasers for value without
notice within those against whom the right of seizure . . . would exist . . . the act would be
unconstitutional as a deprivation of property without due process of law.”).
224 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (indicating that due process rights may
be implicated in connection with the adjudication of such “important rights” as “withdrawal
of public assistance benefits,” “disqualification for unemployment compensation,” “denial of
a tax exemption,” and “discharge from public employment.”).
225 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 694 (8th ed. 2010).
226 See generally Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, OR. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing) [hereinafter Schwartz, Fairness], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1565834 (examining the works of Rawls and Harsanyi in the context of securi-
ties regulation).
227 See, e.g., Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Policy and Personal Identity Over Time, 62 TAX L.
REV. 333, 370 (2009).
228 See Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 226 (manuscript at 10).  The negative effects on the
individual are clear.  The negative effects on society are just as pronounced.  If purchasers
select overpriced or the wrong type of property, appropriately selective market competition
is compromised, and resources will be incorrectly allocated. See id.  If this occurs, “good”
developments or investments will be overvalued, and “bad” developments or investments
will be undervalued.
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it, appears to serve utilitarian goals.  This conclusion, however, is oversimpli-
fied.  Utilitarianism itself does not sufficiently support the intuitive ideal that
surprise liens are pernicious.
The decision to purchase a piece of real property broadly consists of two
decisions: (1) how much to pay, and (2) what type of property to purchase.229
Complete and accurate information regarding potential and actual liens aids in
the first decision but not necessarily in the latter.  Accordingly, the price could
be accurate, but purchasers still might purchase the wrong type of property.230
It seems logical that, even if the purchase is not perfect, complete information
should at least make the price more accurate, but this is not necessarily the
case.  Although correct pricing is generally an important factor as to whether
individual utility is maximized, that is not unavoidably so where one buys pri-
marily for investment purposes.231  In such a situation, the purchaser’s utility is
measured solely by whether the value of the property purchased rises, not
whether the initial price was accurate.232  Additionally, it is not really clear that
society has much of an interest in whether buyers and sellers of real property
receive the “right” price.  Purchasing and selling real property primarily acts as
a transfer of resources among the parties to the transaction in which society
neither suffers nor benefits.233  That is, if a buyer pays too much, a seller
receives that overpayment as excess, so the imbalance has a zero net effect on
society as a whole.  Accordingly, whether real property prices are “right”
should have no real effect on social well-being.
However, finding a defensible justification for the law’s abhorrence of
surprise liens is important, because a failure to do so could call into question a
seemingly basic element of real property law.  In order to do so, we must go
beyond a basic analysis of utilitarianism.  The works of John Rawls and John
Harsanyi do just that.
The Rawlsian view of justice and social obligation is based largely on the
earlier work of Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and
John Locke.234  Rawls contrasted the real world in which our norms and ethics
evolved with that of a clean social slate—or an “original position”—in which
the founding members of society could originally and fairly establish a com-
229 See id.
230 Whether purchased for personal or investment purposes, the purchase of real property is
likely a significant financial transaction to the purchaser.  Likewise, regardless of the precise
purpose of the transaction, it will only serve the intent of the purchaser if it is the right class
of property.
231 See Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 226 (manuscript at 11) (citing Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securi-
ties Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 700 (1989)).
232 See id. Purchasing real estate for investment purposes has assumed a heightened import-
ance in modern commerce, and buying property merely “to live in” has come to be an
increasingly quaint pursuit.  And when one purchases for investment purposes, one is merely
concerned with profit, which depends on appreciation, and which makes realty seem very
much like a security. See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALY, ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 192-99 (10th ed. 2011) (describing the “Capital Asset Pricing Model” for securi-
ties, which focuses on return and risk).
233 See Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 226 (manuscript at 12 & n.64).
234 See Samuel Freeman, Introduction to THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 1, 10
(Samuel Freeman ed., 2003).
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plete slate of laws and social institutions.235  In an original position, founders
would create a society from a position of ignorance wherein they would not
know whether their interests in the new social order would be ones of privilege
or poverty.236  Rawls concluded that this ignorance would cause these individu-
als to establish a system that equally distributes good fortune among all mem-
bers of the community.237  Such a system, focusing on equality and reciprocity,
would incorporate the “difference principle,” which is “an agreement to regard
the distribution of native endowments as a common asset and to share the bene-
fits of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.”238  Thus, arbitrarily allotted
endowments, such as good fortune, inherent talent, or native intelligence,
would be shared with the less fortunate.239
This difference principle provides a moral and ethical justification for
helping the poor, but it also provides the same justifications for risk manage-
ment on a societal scale.  According to Rawls, if individuals recognize that
good or bad fortune is the result of pure chance, they will create a society
wherein the randomness of fortune is shared equally by all.240  This concept of
sharing and spreading random risk suggests that government should help indi-
viduals manage volatility because volatility is a random manifestation of for-
tune and so a significant cause of risk.
This concept of risk-and-reward distribution and risk management dove-
tails nicely with the ethical philosophy posited by John Harsanyi.241  Professor
Harsanyi began his analysis similarly to Rawls, by conceiving individuals
building a society from nothing.242  These founders must design a society in
which they will participate, but they do not know whether they will benefit or
suffer from the flights of fortune.243  Here, Harsanyi and Rawls part company.
Harsanyi posits that such individuals (rather than accepting and embracing reci-
procity) would seek to create systems and structures that maximize expected
utility.244  In truth, however, this position, and its logical result, is quite close to
that of Rawls.  Harsanyi’s founders, in attempting to maximize utility from
their state of ignorance, must rationally plan for the possibility that they might
begin from a personal position of good fortune or bad fortune.245  Doing so
would necessarily prod them to create a society that would protect them from
risk if they began on the bottom rung of society.246
235 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 225 (Erin Kelly ed., 1971).
236 See id. at 118-123.
237 See id.
238 See Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 226 (manuscript at 13) (quoting JOHN RAWLS, JUS-
TICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 75 (2001)).
239 See id.
240 See id.
241 This juxtaposition is telling, given that Rawls ostensibly developed his difference princi-
pal and resultant view of risk sharing in response to utilitarianism, which he viewed as
insufficient. See Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 226 (manuscript at 16) (relying on SERGE-
CHISTOPHE KOLM, MODERN THEORIES OF JUSTICE 169 (1996)).
242 See John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality?  A
Critique of John Rawls’s Theory, 69 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 594, 598 (1975).
243 See id.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 598-600.
246 See id.
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Both Rawls and Harsanyi agree that society should manage risk by reduc-
ing volatility and risk as much as possible.247  One of the primary ways in
which society can do this is by fostering accurate information.248  Surprise liens
are, by definition, secret, and therefore antithetical to accuracy.  Accordingly,
preventing secret liens serves the goal of risk management and is a legitimate
and important social goal stemming from Rawls’s and Harsanyi’s views of
social justice.249
VI. CONCLUSION
Surprise liens have a long and storied history, and much real property and
commercial law has been fashioned to prevent them and avoid their conse-
quences.  Real property recording acts, and the notice filing system accompa-
nying them, significantly reduced the presence and significance of these liens,
and have created a widespread belief among attorneys and lay people that sur-
prise liens either no longer exist or pose no true danger to bona fide purchasers.
This belief is not accurate, however, because surprise liens have never entirely
gone away and lawmakers are increasingly willing to make surprise liens avail-
able to certain classes of lienors.
This increasing willingness, as demonstrated by the recent emergence of
the estate tax lien and mechanics’ liens that relate back, is potentially explica-
ble due to theoretical criticisms of the efficiency and utility of real property
notice systems.  These arguments, however, do not withstand existing criticism
or review in light of recent economic events.  The elimination of these justifica-
tions and the nature of, and circumstances associated with, surprise liens indi-
cate that the true reason underlying the recent trend toward accepting surprise
liens is a belief by lawmakers that certain classes of lienors should be afforded
special consideration because doing so benefits society at large.
However, such reasoning is insufficient to support the existence of suprise
liens for numerous reasons.  First, there is reason to think the belief that society
benefits from such liens is false.  Although some benefit may accrue to society,
such liens also cause significant costs to society in the forms of increased infor-
mation costs, litigation related externalities, and increased title insurance pre-
miums.  Second, the individual costs of surprise liens are likely higher than
believed.  Finally, surprise liens strike at basic and deeply held conceptions of
ethics and fairness inherent in our system of property rights and should not be
permitted lightly.
Accordingly, lawmakers should eschew the temptation to permit privi-
leged classes of lienors the right to surprise liens.  This can be done easily by
eliminating statutory and judicial exceptions to the existing real property
recording acts, which require all parties to put the public on notice of their
claimed interests.  Doing so simply and effectively avoids the economic and
247 Rawls and Harsanyi have both acknowledged the similar conclusions fostered by their
philosophies. See  Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 226 (manuscript at 17 n.96 and accompa-
nying text).
248 See Schwartz, Fairness, supra note 226 (manuscript at 18) (citing George J. Stigler, The
Economics of Information, 59 J. POL. ECON. 213, 214 (1961)).
249 See id. (manuscript at 13-19).
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equitable costs discussed above, comports with basic American conceptions of
fairness, and is consistent with the basic beliefs and expectations of society at
large.
